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ARTICLE 
TAXING THE GIG ECONOMY 
KATHLEEN DELANEY THOMAS† 
Due to advances in technology like mobile applications and online platforms, 
millions of American workers now earn income through “gig” work, which allows 
them the flexibility to set their own hours and choose which jobs to take. To the surprise 
of many gig workers, the tax law considers them to be “business owners,” which 
subjects them to onerous recordkeeping and filing requirements, along with the 
obligation to pay quarterly estimated taxes. This Article proposes two reforms that 
would drastically reduce tax compliance burdens for this new generation of small 
business owners, while simultaneously enhancing the government’s ability to collect 
tax revenue. 
First, Congress should create a “non-employee withholding” regime that would 
allow online platform companies such as Uber to withhold taxes for their workers 
without being classified as employers. Second, this Article proposes a “standard 
business deduction” for gig workers, which would eliminate the need to track and 
report business expenses. Although this Article focuses on the gig economy as an 
illustration of how the workplace has evolved in recent years, the proposals could apply 
more broadly to taxation of small, individually run businesses. In an era when the use 
of cash is on the decline and information can be shared rapidly at little cost, it is time 
for policymakers to institute a more modern tax enforcement regime for small businesses. 
 
 
† Assistant Professor of Law, UNC School of Law. I am grateful to Lily Batchelder, John Coyle, 
Lilian Faulhaber, J. Clifton Fleming, Jacob Goldin, Itai Grinberg, Rachel Gurvich, Andrew Hayashi, 
Daniel Hemel, Kristin Hickman, Michael Knoll, Omri Marian, Eric Muller, Shu-Yi Oei, Jason Oh, 
Peter Reilly, Emily Satterthwaite, Richard Schmalbeck, Daniel Shaviro, Steven Sheffrin, Gladriel 
Shobe, Keith Taylor and his colleagues at New Zealand’s Inland Revenue Department, Courtney 
Thomas, David Walker, and Larry Zelenak, as well as participants at workshops at BYU Law School, 
Columbia Law School, Duke University School of Law, Georgetown Law, UC Irvine School of Law, 
University of Minnesota Law School, NYU School of Law, and Tulane University Law School for 
helpful discussions, comments, and feedback on this Article. 
1416 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 1415 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 1417 
I. TAX ISSUES FOR WORKERS IN THE GIG ECONOMY ................... 1419 
A. Background on the Gig Economy ................................................. 1419 
B. Tax Issues Related to Gig Work ..................................................... 1421 
1. Tax Implications of Non-Employee Status ........................... 1422 
2. Information Reporting for Gig Workers .............................. 1425 
3. Gig Workers Are Business Owners, But Many Don’t Know It ...... 1428 
4. The Need for a New Regime .............................................. 1430 
II. A NEW TAX REGIME FOR THE GIG ECONOMY ......................... 1431 
A. The “New” Small Business Owners: What’s Changed ...................... 1432 
1. Tax Enforcement in the Old Economy .............................. 1432 
2.  Tax Enforcement in the New Economy ............................. 1433 
B. Expanded Information Reporting .................................................. 1436 
C. Non-Employee Withholding ......................................................... 1437 
1. Why Withholding Matters ................................................ 1437 
2. Details of the Proposal ...................................................... 1443 
a. Scope of Withholding ....................................................... 1443 
b. Self-Employment Taxes ................................................... 1445 
c. Setting an Appropriate Rate ............................................. 1445 
d. Calculating Self-Employment & Income Taxes Based on 
Net Income .................................................................. 1447 
i. Estimating Net Income .......................................... 1447 
ii. Calculating Tax Liability on Presumed Net Income .... 1449 
e. Implementation Details ................................................... 1450 
f. Opt-Out ........................................................................ 1453 
D. The Standard Business Deduction ................................................. 1454 
1. Why Allow a Standard Business Deduction? ...................... 1454 
2. Details of the Proposal ...................................................... 1457 
a. Structure and Scope of the SBD ........................................ 1457 
b. Earnings Cap ................................................................ 1459 
c. Flat Versus Percentage SBD: An Example .......................... 1460 
d. Costs and Benefits of an SBD ........................................... 1461 
e. Equity Implications of an SBD ......................................... 1462 
f. Additional Drawbacks of a Flat SBD ................................. 1462 
g. Coordination with Gross Receipts Withholding .................... 1463 
E. Combining the Proposals: Examples .............................................. 1464 
III. ISSUES AND OBJECTIONS ....................................................... 1466 
A. The Scope of the Proposals ........................................................... 1466 
B. Objections Related to Withholding ................................................. 1467 
C. Objections Related to the SBD ...................................................... 1469 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 1472 
2018] Taxing the Gig Economy 1417 
INTRODUCTION 
Technology is revolutionizing the way we do business. Online platforms 
like Uber and TaskRabbit now efficiently connect service providers and other 
workers with willing consumers. This new mode of transacting has 
transformed the landscape for twenty-first century workers. No longer must 
they choose between working solely as an employee (subject to the 
restrictions and control of their employer) and starting their own business 
(requiring an investment of time and money to do things like advertise and 
find a customer base). Using mobile applications, workers can now tap into 
the existing infrastructure and customer network of an online platform 
company, while still maintaining the freedom to set their own hours and 
choose which jobs to take.1 As a result, millions of Americans have joined the 
so-called “gig economy”2 in recent years, and that number continues to rise.3 
The profile of the twenty-first century gig worker is somewhat different 
than that of a traditional small business owner. The former tend to be 
younger, less financially sophisticated, work fewer hours—often 
supplementing traditional employment with gig work—and make less money. 
Whereas a traditional sole proprietor who owns a catering business, for 
example, might earn $100,000 per year working 40-hour weeks, a typical Uber 
driver earns less than $10,000 per year and works fewer than 15 hours per 
week.4 Because the majority of gig workers use online platforms to 
supplement wages or otherwise earn part-time income, they are commonly 
thought of as independent contractors rather than small business owners. 
But from a tax perspective, there is little distinction between the full-time 
caterer and the 10 hours per-week Uber driver. For tax law purposes, if an individual 
earns income from services outside of the traditional employee–employer 
relationship, that individual is a “business owner” for tax purposes. What this 
means is that the Uber driver earning $8,000 per year must file the same 
 
1 See SARAH A. DONOVAN, DAVID H. BRADLEY & JON O. SHIMABUKURO, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R44365, What Does the Gig Economy Mean for Workers? 1 (2016) (“[G]ig jobs may 
yield benefits relative to traditional employment in terms of the ease of finding employment and 
greater flexibility to choose jobs and hours.”). 
2 See id. (“The gig economy is the collection of markets that match providers to consumers on 
a gig (or job) basis in support of on-demand commerce.”). 
3 An estimated 2.5 million people earned income in the gig economy as of September 2015, and 
over 10 million reported having done so in the past 3 years. See DIANA FARRELL & FIONA GREIG, 
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. INST., PAYCHECKS, PAYDAYS, AND THE ONLINE PLATFORM 
ECONOMY 29 (2016). These numbers are expected to increase by millions over the next decade. 
CAROLINE BRUCKNER, KOGOD TAX POLICY CENTER, SHORTCHANGED: THE TAX 
COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES OF SMALL BUSINESS OPERATORS DRIVING THE ON-DEMAND 
PLATFORM ECONOMY 3 (2016). 
4 See BRUCKNER, supra note 3, at 5 (“[I]n 2015, more than 75% of Lyft drivers reported working 
less than 15 hours per week, and more than half of Uber drivers worked less than 10 hours per week.”). 
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complex tax forms and make the same quarterly tax filings as a seasoned, 
wealthy business owner. And the tax implications of being a business owner 
can be severe. Because there is no employer to withhold taxes, business 
owners must budget for self-employment and income taxes on their own and 
pay quarterly estimated taxes to avoid imposition of a penalty. The taxpayer 
must also keep receipts and other detailed records of expenses to calculate their 
taxable income on IRS Schedule C, which can be a burdensome and time-
consuming process. Many gig workers do not consider themselves to be business 
owners and have never filed business-related tax returns; thus they are at best 
confused by, and at worst completely unaware of, their tax obligations. 
For a more established business owner—one who earns significant 
income, has an established book and recordkeeping system, and likely 
employs an accountant—the current business tax regime may be appropriate. 
But that regime is a mismatch for lower-income and potentially 
unsophisticated gig workers. Subjecting them to tax compliance rules aimed 
at traditional sole proprietors is not only burdensome but also likely leads to 
lower tax compliance, which in turn leads to less revenue for the government. 
It is also inefficient, as individuals spend hours of time navigating complex 
tax rules to report relatively low amounts of income. 
This Article argues for a new tax regime to apply to workers in the 
growing gig economy. In doing so, it proposes two fundamental changes to 
the current tax law. First, it calls for “non-employee withholding” on earnings 
paid out by online platform companies like Uber and TaskRabbit. Like 
traditional employers, platform companies would withhold a fixed percentage 
of a gig worker’s gross receipts to cover the worker’s self-employment and 
income tax obligations, obviating the need for the worker to file quarterly 
estimated taxes. Second, the Article proposes a “standard business deduction” 
(SBD) for gig workers. Like the regular standard deduction, the SBD would 
be optional and the taxpayer could forego it if actual business deductions 
exceeded the SBD. However, if the taxpayer chose the SBD, she would simply 
report her net business income by subtracting the SBD from her gross 
receipts,5 eliminating the need for her to track and report business expenses. 
This highly simplified tax regime should improve compliance and taxpayer 
morale among gig workers, as well as increase efficiency by reducing the time, 
financial cost, and anxiety associated with tax compliance. 
While this Article focuses specifically on gig workers to illustrate how the 
business landscape has changed in recent years, the proposals could apply 
 
5 This Article primarily discusses an SBD equal to sixty percent of gross receipts, which is based 
on historic average profit ratios for small sole proprietorships of around forty percent. However, it also 
considers alternatives, such as a variable SBD based on whether the worker is in a labor-only industry 
(e.g., childcare) or a labor-plus-capital industry (e.g., driving a car). See infra Section II.D. 
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more broadly to individual small business owners. Alternative work 
arrangements are on the rise, money is changing hands electronically, and 
sharing information is easier and cheaper than ever before. On the plus side, 
this means that tracking income and withholding taxes are often viable now 
when they previously were not. The downside is that more and more taxpayers 
are being subjected to complicated tax reporting rules for relatively small 
amounts of income. Thus, this Article’s ultimate goal is to advocate for an 
updated tax regime that reflects the modern realities of small business ownership. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides general background on 
the gig economy and the current tax rules applicable to all small business 
owners, including gig workers. Part II details the two proposals: non-employee 
withholding and the standard business deduction. Part III explores potential 
issues, objections, and alternatives to the proposed regime. 
I. TAX ISSUES FOR WORKERS IN THE GIG ECONOMY 
This Part summarizes the evolution of the gig economy and discusses 
particular tax challenges faced by gig workers. Many of these challenges apply 
more broadly to all types of individual small business owners.6 However, it is 
useful to focus on the gig economy because it highlights two trends that are 
highly relevant to the design of tax compliance policies. First, digitization has 
made commercial transactions traceable when they previously were not, 
which can greatly improve tax enforcement. Second, the role of platform 
companies as online intermediaries enables tax authorities to gather 
information about multiple taxpayers from a single source. 
A. Background on the Gig Economy 
Advances in technology and the proliferation of smartphones have made 
it vastly easier for consumers to connect with providers of goods and services 
via the Internet or mobile applications.7 This new virtual marketplace has 
been created by a number of online platform companies like Uber, Lyft, 
TaskRabbit, and Airbnb,8 whose websites and apps allow consumers to search 
 
6 For purposes of this Article, I use “small business” to refer to individually operated sole 
proprietorships, not businesses operated through corporations or pass-through entities, which implicate 
additional tax rules. Given that most gig workers operate on a small scale and frequently are not 
financially sophisticated, presumably the vast majority do not operate through a separate entity. 
7 DONOVAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 1. 
8 While driving services (e.g., Uber and Lyft) and personal services (e.g., TaskRabbit) are 
perhaps the most well-known gig economy sectors, there are many others, such as medical care, 
delivery, and business services. See id. at 2. For a description of twenty-six “prominent online 
intermediary companies,” see SETH HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, HAMILTON PROJECT, A 
PROPOSAL FOR MODERNIZING LABOR LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY WORK: THE 
“INDEPENDENT WORKER” 28-33 (2015). 
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for and purchase goods or services. At the same time, the platforms allow 
workers to advertise and sell goods or services in exchange for a fee (typically 
a percentage of the worker’s receipts from use of the platform).9 
The “gig workers” who are providing goods and services through online 
platforms represent a departure from the typical twentieth-century worker. 
Prior to the advent of the on-demand economy, most workers were 
employees, usually sacrificing some measure of control and flexibility in 
return for steady wages and other benefits like health insurance. A smaller 
subset of workers were self-employed—i.e., individuals who operate their 
own businesses or work as freelancers. Self-employment offers the control 
and flexibility absent from traditional employment but may come at the 
expense of high startup costs and income insecurity. But in recent years, 
online platforms have broadened the opportunity for individuals to become 
self-employed by vastly reducing these startup costs.10 
Nowadays, no longer must an individual establish a customer base, incur 
marketing and advertising costs, or build a brick and mortar storefront to earn 
income outside of the employment context.11 In exchange for a fee to the 
platform company, the customer base and other necessary infrastructure to 
earn income are in place on day one, and the worker maintains much of the 
flexibility and control associated with self-employment. 
As a result of these relatively recent technological innovations, there has 
been a dramatic rise in non-employee work arrangements in the past decade 
that is expected to continue.12 Each month, more than three million workers 
earn money through online platforms by doing things like driving, running 
errands, renting rooms or apartments, or selling goods.13 Platform work is 
currently the fastest growing segment of the labor market, with the size of 
the on-demand economy expected to at least double by 2020.14 
 
9 For a more in-depth discussion of the gig economy, including its impact on tax compliance 
and strategies to promote compliance, see generally Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, Can Sharing Be 
Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 989 (2016). 
10 See DONOVAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 2. 
11 Id. 
12 From 2005 to 2015, the number of alternative work arrangements in the United States rose 
from 14.2 million to 23.6 million, an increase of 66.5 percent. BRUCKNER, supra note 3, at 2 (citing 
Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The Rise and Nature of Alternative Work Arrangements in the 
United States, 1995–2015 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22667, 2016). The 
number of participants in the gig economy has increased nearly forty-seven times between 2012 and 
2015, with gig earnings increasing tenfold. FARRELL & GREIG, supra note 3, at 21. 
13 See BRUCKNER, supra note 3, at 4 (“[M]ore than 3.2 million Americans [are] currently 
working in the on-demand platform economy.”). 
14 See The Sharing Economy: A Taxing Experience for New Entrepreneurs Part I: Hearing Before the 
H. Comm. on Small Bus., 114th Cong. 38 (2016) (statement of Caroline Bruckner, Managing Director, 
Kogod Tax Policy Center) [hereinafter Testimony of Professor Caroline Bruckner] (estimating that 
seven million individuals will work in the platform economy by 2020). 
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For many gig workers, platform earnings are a secondary source of income, 
often supplementing wages.15 For workers providing services (e.g., driving or 
running errands), a recent study showed average monthly earnings of $533 
($6396 annually), which represented about a third of the total monthly income 
of those workers.16 For those who lease assets or sell goods (e.g., renting a house 
or selling jewelry), average earnings were just $314 per month ($3768 annually), 
representing 20 percent of total income.17 These lower income amounts, 
generally less than $10,000 per year for most gig workers,18 reflect less than 
full-time hours invested in gig work. In one survey of gig workers, 72 percent 
reported that they work for platform companies less than 10 hours per week, 
while 92 percent reported working for platforms less than 20 hours per week.19 
B. Tax Issues Related to Gig Work 
Currently, most online platform companies treat their gig workers as 
independent contractors rather than as employees for tax (and other) 
purposes.20 The employee/contractor distinction is a hotly contested issue in 
this context, and many gig workers have argued that they deserve the various 
legal protections that come with employee status, such as overtime pay, the 
right to organize, and health benefits.21 The employment status of gig workers 
is subject to ongoing litigation22 and this Article does not attempt to resolve 
that debate.23 Instead, I assume the status quo will remain in place for the 
 
15 See FARRELL & GREIG, supra note 3, at 24 (noting that the platform earnings were “sizable” 
even if not the primary source of income); see also Emilie Jackson et al., The Rise of Alternative Work 
Arrangements: Evidence and Implications for Tax Filing and Benefit Coverage 16 (Office of Tax Analysis, 
Working Paper No. 114, 2017) (reporting that 39 percent of gig workers are primarily wage earners, 
19.5 percent earn a mix of wage and gig income, and 33 percent earn primarily gig income). 
16 FARRELL & GREIG, supra note 3, at 24. 
17 See id. The average Airbnb host is found to earn $7530 annually, significantly higher than 
average earnings for those leasing assets or selling goods. BRUCKNER, supra note 3, at 7. 
18 For example, an Office of Tax Analysis study found that gig workers gross an average of 
$20,000 per year, but that actual profit averaged about $6000. Jackson et al., supra note 15, at 19. 
19 BRUCKNER, supra note 3, at 5. 88 percent of gig workers surveyed earned less than $15,000 
from online platforms in 2015, with 74 percent earning less than $5000. Id. 
20 Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 1042-45. 
21 Gig workers have alleged, for example, that their arrangements violate the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, which requires minimum wage and overtime. DONOVAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 8. 
22 For a discussion of gig worker classification claims in federal and state courts, see id. at 8-9. 
23 Some commentators have argued that gig workers do not fit neatly into either classification 
and that a new third category of worker is needed. See, e.g., HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 8 
(proposing an “independent worker” classification for gig workers). Harris and Krueger note that 
gig workers are not as independent as true independent contractors because they generally cannot 
negotiate their compensation, yet they don’t have the extensive and ongoing relationships with 
platform companies that are typical of an employer–employee relationship. Id. at 7. The proposed 
“independent worker” classification would carry some benefits associated with employment status 
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foreseeable future (i.e., that gig workers are independent contractors rather 
than employees). Thus, in Part III, I argue for tax reforms that do not depend 
on gig workers being classified as employees. But first, this subsection 
provides a brief overview of the tax implications of non-employee24 status. 
1. Tax Implications of Non-Employee Status 
The characterization of gig workers as independent contractors rather 
than employees affects their tax obligations in several important ways. 
First, employers are required to withhold income taxes on employees’ 
wages.25 This means that most employees do not have to think about their 
income tax obligations during the course of the year. Though income tax 
payments are generally due on a quarterly basis,26 employers fulfill these 
quarterly obligations on their employees’ behalf. When an employee files his 
tax return at the end of the year, he reconciles his annual tax liability with the 
tax previously withheld by his employer and, in most cases, claims a refund.27 
For a worker who does not enjoy employee status, there is no employer to 
withhold income taxes during the course of the year. This means the worker 
generally must budget for taxes and make estimated tax payments four times 
per year,28 in addition to filing a year-end return and paying any additional 
balance due. Failure to make estimated tax payments can result in the 
imposition of a tax penalty when the taxpayer files her year-end return.29 
Independent contractors must also pay self-employment taxes on their 
net earnings. Employees pay employment taxes on their wages as well, but 
the tax burden is split among employees and employers, with employees 
bearing responsibility for a 7.65 percent tax on their wages and employers 
bearing responsibility for another 7.65 percent on those wages.30 In addition 
 
like tax withholding and the ability to obtain health insurance, but it generally would not provide 
labor law protections like overtime and minimum wage. Id. at 15-21. 
24 The terms “non-employee” and “independent contractor” are interchangeable for this purpose. 
25 I.R.C. § 3402 (2012). 
26 § 6654(c). 
27 See Joel Slemrod, Does It Matter Who Writes the Check to the Government? The Economics of Tax 
Remittance, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 251, 265 n.39 (2008) (at least three quarters of taxpayers claim refunds). 
28 § 6654(c)(2). 
29 § 6654(a). To avoid a penalty, total estimated tax payments generally must be at least 90 
percent of the current year’s tax liability or 100 percent of the previous year’s liability. § 6654(d). 
However, the penalty doesn’t apply if the amount of taxed owed is less than $1000. § 6654(e)(1). 
30 See §§ 3101(a)–(b) (representing tax on employees of 6.2 percent for Social Security plus 
1.45 percent for Medicare); §§ 3111(a)–(b) (representing same tax on employers). Additional 
Medicare taxes (0.9 percent) apply for employees paid more than $200,000 per year, and social 
security taxes are not required after the first $127,200 of wages for 2017. See U.S. DEP’T OF 
TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 15, CAL NO. 10000W, (CIRCULAR E), 
EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE 24-25, 33 (2018). The employer may also have to pay federal 
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to paying half of the employment tax, the employer withholds the employee’s 
share of employment taxes and pays them to the IRS,31 so the employee can 
effectively ignore these obligations. The self-employed, on the other hand, are 
responsible for both portions shared by employers and employees, or 15.3 percent 
self-employment tax on net earnings.32 Self-employed workers must include 
payments for self-employment tax in their quarterly estimated tax payments. 
Despite more onerous filing and employment tax obligations, there is a 
major tax advantage to non-employee status if the worker has incurred 
significant business expenses. The tax law makes a crucial distinction between 
business expenses incurred by employees and those incurred by non-employees. 
Non-employee business expenses are deductible in computing adjusted gross 
income; i.e., they are considered “above-the-line” expenses.33 This means 
taxpayers can generally take those deductions in full (assuming they are otherwise 
allowable under the Internal Revenue Code (Code) and not subject to any 
specific limitations), which will reduce the amount of self-employment earnings 
that are subject to income and self-employment taxes. 
In contrast, employee business deductions are itemized deductions taken 
“below the line”—after computing adjusted gross income and before arriving 
at taxable income.34 This means that taxpayers will only take those deductions 
if, combined with other itemized deductions, the total amount exceeds the 
standard deduction.35 Additionally, employee business expenses are 
considered miscellaneous itemized deductions, meaning they are only 
deductible if and to the extent they exceed (when combined with other 
miscellaneous itemized deductions) two percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted 
 
unemployment taxes on the first $7000 of wages at a rate that varies based on the amount of state 
unemployment contributions made. Id. at 37. 
31 I.R.C. § 3102 (2012). 
32 Self-employment taxes apply if an individual earns at least $400 during the year from self-
employment, at a rate of 12.4 percent for social security (subject to the same $127,200 cap as for 
employee wages) and 2.9 percent for Medicare (subject to the same additional 0.9 percent for earnings 
over $200,000). See Topic Number 554—Self-Employment Tax, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc554.html [https://perma.cc/A3XS-DNPT]. However, individuals may 
deduct half of their potential self-employment tax liability from their net business income before 
applying the 15.3 percent rate. Id. Thus, if an individual earned $1000 of net business income, he 
could first deduct $76.50. The result is that only 92.35 percent of net earnings are subject to self-
employment tax. Id. For example, self-employment taxes on $1000 of net self-employment income 
would be 15.3 percent x $923.50 = $141.30. 
33 § 62(a)(1). Additionally, half of self-employment tax is deductible in computing the 
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. Id. 
34 The exception is employee business expenses that are reimbursed, which may be deducted 
in full (above the line) against that reimbursement. § 62(a)(2)(A). 
35 §§ 63(a)–(b). For 2017, the standard deduction for a single taxpayer is $6350. In 2017, Some Tax 
Benefits Increase Slightly Due to Inflation Adjustments, Others Are Unchanged, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/in-2017-some-tax-benefits-increase-slightly-due-to-inflation-
adjustments-others-are-unchanged [https://perma.cc/G5HA-NLTB]. 
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gross income.36 The practical effect of these limitations is that most minor 
employee business expenses are not deductible. Further, in recent tax 
legislation, Congress temporarily repealed all miscellaneous itemized 
deductions, including employee business expenses,37 until December 31, 2025. 
Thus, from 2018 to 2025, employee business expenses are entirely 
nondeductible without regard to the amount.38 
The deductibility of non-employee business expenses—though 
economically beneficial—comes with an administrative drawback. These 
expenses must be documented on a separate form when filing taxes (Schedule 
C39), which adds significant time and complexity to tax return preparation.40 
Deductibility of these expenses also requires taxpayers to keep detailed 
records during the year, which employees can generally avoid since any minor 
expenses they incur are likely non-deductible. 
Finally, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 created an additional tax advantage 
for non-employee workers. Specifically, new Code section 199A provides for a 
deduction of 20 percent of the net business income of any non-corporate 
business, including businesses operating as sole proprietorships.41 For 
example, a gig worker who nets $50,000 from gig work after expenses could 
deduct up to $10,00042 (20 percent of $50,000) on her tax return.43 Although 
certain limitations on the deduction apply to those with taxable incomes 
above $157,500 ($315,000 for married taxpayers filing joint returns),44 the 
 
36 I.R.C. § 67 (2012). 
37 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11045 (amending § 67) [hereinafter Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act]. 
38 Id. 
39 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SCHEDULE C (FORM 1040), PROFIT OR LOSS FROM 
BUSINESS (2017). 
40 Self-employed taxpayers generally must also fill out Schedule SE related to their self-employment 
taxes. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SCHEDULE SE (FORM 1040), SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX 
(2017). Some taxpayers participating in the gig economy may not be subject to Schedule C filing or 
self-employment tax if their only activity is renting real estate and if they are not actively involved 
in providing services related to that real estate (e.g., a person who rents a home on Airbnb but 
hires others to do things like clean the home). In that case, the individual must instead file 
Schedule E. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SCHEDULE E (FORM 1040), SUPPLEMENTAL 
INCOME AND LOSS (2017). 
41 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra note 37, § 11011. Like most of the other tax provisions applicable 
to individuals, the deduction is scheduled to sunset at the end of 2025. I.R.C. § 199A(i) (2012). 
42 The deduction cannot exceed 20 percent of taxable income (less any net capital gain), which 
will be less than net business income if the taxpayer doesn’t have income from other sources. See 
§ 199A(a)(1). So, for example, a taxpayer with pass-through business income of $50,000 but taxable 
income of only $20,000 (after deductions) would only be able to deduct $4,000, not $10,000. 
43 The deduction is a below-the-line deduction (i.e., it reduces taxable income not adjusted 
gross income), but is available to both itemizers and non-itemizers. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra 
note 37, § 11011(b). 
44 See § 199A(e)(2) (providing that threshold amounts are adjusted for inflation). For taxpayers 
with incomes over the threshold amount, the deduction phases out and is eventually eliminated in 
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majority of gig workers do not earn enough to be impacted by those limits, 
and should be able to take advantage of the section 199A deduction. The 
deduction is not available to taxpayers who are employees.45 In essence, 
section 199A provides for a lower effective tax rate on earnings of 
independent contractors as compared to the tax imposed on equivalent 
earnings of employees. While this makes gig work more advantageous from 
a tax perspective, section 199A will no doubt add additional complexity to tax 
return preparation and to the calculation of estimated taxes for gig workers. 
2. Information Reporting for Gig Workers 
Because they generally treat gig workers as independent contractors,46 
platform companies are not required to withhold income taxes or pay 
employment taxes with respect to these workers.47 However, the Code does 
impose certain information reporting requirements for independent 
contractors that are relevant in this context. While these information 
reporting requirements generally help gig workers track their gross receipts, 
ambiguities in the current regime leave many workers without access to tax 
information from platform companies. 
Information reporting generally describes the process by which third 
parties issue year-end information statements (often on Form 1099) to certain 
private parties with whom they have transacted, while simultaneously 
transmitting that information to the IRS.48 For example, a bank at which a 
taxpayer has an account will send a Form 1099-INT at the end of the tax year 
 
certain circumstances. First, high earning taxpayers cannot claim the deduction if they work in a 
“specified service business” (including fields such as law, health, and investment advisory services). 
§§ 199A(d)(1)–(3). Second, for those with income over the applicable threshold, the deduction is 
limited by the amount of W-2 wages paid by the business and/or by the amount of depreciable 
business property held by the business. §§ 199A(b)(2)–(3). For a helpful summary of these rules, 
see generally Section 199A Deductions—Pass Thru Tax Breaks, WATSON CPA GROUP, 
https://www.watsoncpagroup.com/Section199A.pdf [https://perma.cc/A946-NP5N]. 
45 See § 199A(d)(1) (defining a “qualified trade or business” as “any trade or business other 
than [either] a specified service trade or business, or the trade or business of performing services 
as an employee”). 
46 This Article uses “independent contractor” and “small business owner” interchangeably; 
both refer to non-employee workers, and the tax law essentially treats an independent contractor as 
a “business owner” by requiring a Schedule C to be filed. See Self-Employed Individuals Tax Center, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/self-
employed-individuals-tax-center [https://perma.cc/H3HJ-HSJR] (defining self-employed as one 
who “carr[ies] on a trade or business as a sole proprietor or an independent contractor”). 
47 These companies would still have employment tax and withholding obligations with respect 
to other workers who are properly classified as employees. For example, Uber does not treat its 
drivers as employees, but it likely has many full-time employees to operate its business, like financial 
analysts, lawyers, office managers, etc. 
48 See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is 
Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORD. L. REV. 1733, 1736-39 (2010). 
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to inform the taxpayer of how much taxable interest his account earned that 
year and will also provide that information to the IRS.49 The IRS, in turn, 
will automatically “match” the information with the taxpayer’s tax return to 
ensure that the interest income is reported.50 
Two information reporting provisions are relevant to gig workers. First, the 
Code requires that payments made to an independent contractor for services 
aggregating over $600 in the tax year must be reported on Form 1099-MISC.51 
In theory, this means that, if an Uber driver receives $4000 in payments from 
Uber in 2016, Uber would issue a Form 1099 to the driver to reflect that amount. 
However, a second information reporting provision has created some 
confusion in this area. That provision requires that banks, credit card 
companies, and “third party settlement organizations” report payments to 
certain payees on Form 1099-K.52 Importantly for this purpose, payers that 
are considered to be third party settlement organizations—that is, non-bank 
entities that make payments for goods or services on behalf of others through 
a central account (PayPal, for example)53—are subject to a de minimis rule. 
The de minimis rule states that third party settlement organizations need 
only report payments to a single payee that exceed $20,000 and represent over 
200 payment transactions in the aggregate.54 Thus, for platform companies 
like Uber, who appear to qualify as third party settlement organizations,55 the 
1099-K reporting requirements only apply with respect to a worker to whom 
the platform company pays at least $20,000 in a given year and who 
accumulates payments from at least 200 different transactions.56 
The confusion stems from the interaction of the 1099-MISC reporting 
requirements (section 6041(a)) and the 1099-K reporting requirements 
(section 6050W). Regulations under section 6041(a) state that, when both 
 
49 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-1(a)(1)(i) (as amended in 1983). 
50 Cf. Lederman, supra note 48, at 1738 n.20 (describing the IRS’s pursuance of discrepancies 
that it finds as part of the information reporting process). 
51 See I.R.C. § 6041(a) (2012). There are certain limitations to the scope of this requirement: 
the payment must be made in the course of the payer’s trade or business, and the rule does not 
apply to payments for goods or to payments made to a corporation. See INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., 2018 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1099-MISC 7 (2018). 
52 See I.R.C. § 6050W(a) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.6050W-1(a) (2010). 
53 I.R.C. § 6050W(b)(3). 
54 § 6050W(e). 
55 Oei and Ring note that this position is “at least debatable,” since platform companies could 
potentially be viewed as “aggregated payees” under section 6050W. Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 
1036. An aggregated payee collects payments from a bank or credit card company on behalf of other 
payees and is effectively treated as a bank for purposes of the 1099-K reporting rules, meaning there 
is no $20,000/200 transaction reporting threshold. See § 6050W(b)(4)(A). 
56 Payments that the platform company collects from others (riders in the case of Uber) are 
subject to this rule. However, direct payments to workers from the platform company—such as a cash 
bonus—are not, and should instead be subject to the 1099-MISC reporting rules under section 6041. 
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requirements apply, the 1099-K reporting requirements trump.57 But that 
creates a surprising result: the section 6050W rules, which were intended 
to expand information reporting,58 effectively eliminate information 
reporting for transactions under $20,000 as long as a third party settlement 
organization is involved.59 
This strange loophole has created uncertainty amongst taxpayers and tax 
professionals.60 For now, it appears at least some platform companies have 
taken the position that the 1099-K rules, including the de minimis threshold, 
govern their information reporting requirements.61 This means those 
companies are only reporting income for their workers when the $20,000/200 
transactions threshold is exceeded, rather than the much smaller $600 
threshold for 1099-MISC reporting. Others have taken a more conservative 
approach, interpreting the regulations as requiring issuance of a 1099-K in 
lieu of a 1099-MISC when both requirements would apply, but without regard 
to the de minimis threshold.62 
 
57 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-1(a)(1)(iv) (2017) (“Transactions that . . . otherwise would be subject to 
reporting under both sections 6041 and 6050W are reported under section 6050W and not section 6041.”). 
58 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION 
OF DIVISION C OF H.R. 3221, THE “HOUSING ASSISTANCE TAX ACT OF 2008” AS SCHEDULED 
FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON JULY 23, 2008, at 60-61 (2008) 
(explaining that section 6050W, which was enacted by the Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008, was 
intended improve compliance among merchants who do not accurately report gross income by 
requiring information reporting for credit card payments made to those merchants). 
59 The language in the regulations is somewhat ambiguous, however, as the final sentence 
states: “Solely for purposes of this paragraph, the de minimis threshold for third party network 
transactions in § 1.6050W-1(c)(4) is disregarded in determining whether the transaction is subject 
to reporting under section 6050W.” Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-1(a)(1)(iv) (2010). Commentators have 
noted that one interpretation is that payments to payees under the $20,000/200 threshold are now 
exempted from information reporting even if section 6041 would have otherwise applied. Another 
interpretation is that section 1099-K reporting applies in lieu of 1099-MISC reporting where there 
is overlap, but the de minimis threshold does not apply, meaning all transactions must be reported 
on Form 1099-K when section 6041 would have applied. See, e.g., Erik J. Christenson & Amanda T. 
Kottke, Guidance Needed to Clarify Reporting Obligations for Online Marketplaces and Peer-to-Peer Platforms, 
55 TAX MGMT. MEM. 243, 249-50 (2014) (outlining multiple interpretations of this statutory scheme); 
Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 1037 (same); cf. Kelly Phillips Erb, Credit Cards, the IRS, Form 1099-K and 
the $19,399 Reporting Hole, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/
2014/08/29/credit-cards-the-irs-form-1099-k-and-the-19399-reporting-hole [https://perma.cc/9S5Z-3E95] 
(noting the confusion created by the statutory ambiguity). 
60 See Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 1034-38 (exploring the ambiguities in tax forms issued by 
ridesharing companies and the confusion over which reporting requirements apply); Erb, supra note 59. 
61 Oei and Ring report that, for 2014, Lyft and Sidecar issued 1099-Ks only if their drivers received 
more than $20,000 from rides or had over 200 rides, but issued 1099-MISCs if driver received direct 
bonus payments over $600. Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 1034-35. Airbnb has taken a similar position 
that it will only issue a 1099-K to hosts that exceed the $20,000/200 threshold. Id. at 1037. 
62 Uber appears to take this position and issues a Form 1099-K to all drivers without regard to 
the de minimis threshold. See Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, The Tax Lives of Uber Drivers: Evidence 
from Internet Discussion Forums, 8 COLUM. J. TAX. L. 56, 65 (2017) (explaining that, beginning in 
2015, Uber “issu[ed] Form 1099-K to drivers for all driving payments, no matter how small”). 
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The result of some companies using the $20,000/200 reporting threshold 
is that substantially fewer gig workers are receiving information statements 
than if platform companies were issuing Form 1099s to workers receiving 
more than $600.63 Recall that the majority of gig workers earn under $10,000 
per year from platform companies, which does not trigger the $20,000 
threshold for 1099-K reporting.64 As a result, not only does the IRS not 
receive information about earnings for those workers to aid in its enforcement 
efforts, but the workers themselves don’t receive that information either. 
From the worker’s perspective, this lack of information reporting imposes a 
higher compliance burden, because it forces them to keep records of gross 
receipts that may be avoidable if the platform company were sharing that 
information with them. 
3. Gig Workers Are Business Owners, But Many Don’t Know It 
To summarize the previous sections, the tax implications of independent 
contractor status for gig workers are crucial. On the plus side, these workers 
can deduct their business-related costs and can deduct up to 20 percent of 
their net business income under new section 199A. For an Uber driver, for 
example, this might mean deducting gas, car repairs, and depreciation on her 
car as business expenses,65 all before calculating the section 199A deduction. 
However, despite these economic advantages, gig workers also bear the 
administrative burden of being treated as a “business owner” for tax purposes. 
It should be restated that these workers are generally treated as such without 
regard to how many hours they work, how much they earn in the gig 
economy,66 or whether they also have wage income. This means that gig 
workers are responsible for detailed recordkeeping of expenses, budgeting for 
taxes, making quarterly estimated tax payments, paying self-employment 
taxes, and completing complex tax forms at the end of the year. And while 
 
63 In one study, 61 percent of gig workers surveyed said they did not receive a Form 1099. 
BRUCKNER, supra note 3, at 15. 
64 See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text. 
65 In lieu of deducting car-related expenses (like gas and depreciation), drivers can elect to 
claim the standard mileage deduction, which is calculated at a fixed rate (currently $0.545 for 2018) 
per mile driven in a business capacity. See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(j)(2) (as amended in 2010); I.R.S. 
News Release IR-2017-204 (Dec. 14, 2017). For a more in-depth discussion of deductible driver 
expenses and related issues, see Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 1009-13. 
66 One caveat is that self-employed taxpayers are not required to file an income tax return or 
report self-employment tax unless they have at least $400 of net self-employment income. See U.S. 
DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 1040 INSTRUCTIONS 2017, at 10 (2018) 
(mandating that, for the year 2016, a taxpayer must file a return if she “had net earnings from self-
employment of at least $400”); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2017 INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCHEDULE 
SE (FORM 1040) 1 (2017) (instructing persons with “net earnings of $400 or more as a self-employed 
person” to pay self-employment tax). 
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some of these workers may receive information statements that help them 
track gross receipts, many others do not. 
Dealing with the complexity of the business tax regime is no small feat 
for gig workers, many of whom are young and financially inexperienced,67 and 
work only part-time for platform companies.68 Because they are often 
unaware that the tax law considers them to be business owners,69 many gig 
workers don’t realize that they must pay estimated taxes or that they are 
subject to self-employment taxes.70 This ignorance is understandable, since 
individuals who previously have earned only wage income would have no 
experience with these features of the tax system. 
Even taxpayers who realize that they must make quarterly payments 
might have trouble budgeting for taxes or even estimating how much to set 
aside during the year.71 To make matters worse, taxpayers who do not properly 
budget may find themselves subject to penalties and interest when they file 
their tax return if they cannot come up with the funds to pay the income and 
self-employment taxes that they owe.72 Others may face additional difficulty 
at the end of the year if they did not keep detailed records of receipts and 
expenses. Even workers who receive 1099s may be confused about how to use 
gross receipts information to calculate their tax liability.73 
Business expenses are also particularly challenging for gig workers. In one 
survey, nearly half of gig workers didn’t know about “any tax deductions, 
expenses or credits that could be claimed related to their on-demand platform 
income.”74 Even those who are aware of the rules surrounding deductible 
 
67 BRUCKNER, supra note 3, at 10. 
68 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
69 See Testimony of Professor Caroline Bruckner, supra note 14, at 3-4 (“Many of these 
taxpayers don’t necessarily realize they are small business owners or what their tax filing obligations 
are until they receive an IRS notice.”). 
70 In one survey of platform workers, roughly a third did not know that they needed to file quarterly 
estimated taxes or what kinds of records they needed to keep, and over forty percent were unable to 
estimate how much tax they would owe on their platform income. Id. at 4. These estimates are likely 
conservative, because the survey covered only people who identified as members of the “National 
Association of the Self-Employed” and presumably many, less sophisticated gig workers do not. 
71 See BRUCKNER, supra note 3, at 11 (“43% of survey respondents were unaware as to how 
much they would owe in taxes and did not set aside money for taxes on that income.”). 
72 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6651(a)(2) (2012) (mandating a five percent penalty for failure to pay tax 
reported on a return more than one month late); § 6654(a) (mandating a penalty for the 
underpayment of tax); § 6601 (mandating interest payments for “underpayment, nonpayment, or 
extensions of time for payment, of tax”). 
73 For example, Uber reports gross amounts on Form 1099-K, and drivers must deduct the fees 
they pay to Uber in calculating their taxable income—which appears to be a source of confusion for 
some drivers. See Oei & Ring, supra note 62, at 87. 
74 BRUCKNER, supra note 3, at 12 (emphasis added). 
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expenses often struggle to apply them to their own situations.75 This 
uncertainty gives workers headaches throughout the year in determining 
which records to keep, and again at the end of the year when taxpayers must 
deal with their tax return and accompanying schedules. Most gig workers 
report that they do not receive tax assistance from the platform company,76 
and many report spending between ten and thirty-five hours preparing their 
tax returns.77 
4. The Need for a New Regime 
As discussed above, the current rules applicable to small business owners 
entail significant compliance burdens. As a result, new and inexperienced gig 
workers bear disproportionately high compliance costs78 relative to their 
business income, including recordkeeping, seeking information about their 
taxes, and preparing tax returns.79 This compliance burden imposes additional 
costs that go beyond the time and expense imposed on the workers 
themselves. High compliance burdens also likely lead to less accurate tax 
returns filed by gig workers, resulting in less revenue collected by the 
government.80 The complexity of the business tax regime also imposes 
significant administrative and enforcement costs on the IRS. The 
government must expend resources to educate and advise confused taxpayers, 
to audit returns, and to potentially prosecute or otherwise penalize offenders. 
In a broad sense, these compliance issues are neither new nor unique. 
Small business owners have always exhibited low compliance rates compared 
 
75 For a fascinating study of this issue in the context of Uber drivers, see Oei & Ring, supra 
note 62. Oei and Ring researched Internet discussion forums to learn about the particular tax 
challenges facing Uber drivers, and found that the highest volume of discussions centered around 
business deductions. 
76 See BRUCKNER, supra note 3, at 13 (finding sixty-nine percent of surveyed workers reported 
not receiving tax assistance from the platform company). 
77 Id. at 13-14. 
78 See, e.g., Martin Sullivan, Tax Challenges for the Uber Economy, FORBES (Jul. 14, 2015), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2015/07/14/tax-challenges-for-the-uber-economy [https://
perma.cc/N9AR-C85R] (“[T]he sharing economy will be bearing significantly larger-than-average 
tax compliance costs.”). 
79 Of course, some gig workers will turn to a tax return preparer for assistance with their return, 
which entails its own costs and does not eliminate the need for the worker to keep records 
throughout the year. 
80 See Mark Phillips & Alan Plumley, Effort and Compliance as Endogenous Taxpayer Decisions 35 
(Paper for 2014 NTA Annual Conference, Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.ntanet.org/wp-content/
uploads/proceedings/2014/141-phillips-plumley-effort-compliance-endogenous-taxpayer-decisions.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6T4G-72DN]] (“[T]axpayers are more likely to choose inaccuracy over exerting the 
effort to be accurate when the ‘easy-to-report’ amount is relatively lower than the expected true 
amount.”); see also Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, User-Friendly Taxpaying, 92 IND. L.J. 1509, 1533-44 (2017) 
(suggesting ways in which policymakers can simplify tax system interactions to encourage compliance). 
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to wage earners,81 in part due to opportunity and in part due to the complexity 
associated with the business tax regime.82 Several commentators have 
identified the efficiency costs and inequity associated with this 
noncompliance.83 However, there are two important reasons to revisit these 
issues in the context of gig workers, as detailed in the next part. First, the 
scale and scope of the businesses operated by most gig workers do not justify 
the compliance and enforcement costs of the current business tax regime. 
Second, advances in technology and the evolution of the platform economy 
have made it possible to simplify compliance obligations for gig workers in a 
way that was not previously possible for traditional small businesses. 
II. A NEW TAX REGIME FOR THE GIG ECONOMY 
The gig economy represents a departure from traditional “small business” 
in various ways. By dramatically lowering the cost of entry, platform 
companies have enabled millions of individuals to become business owners 
with little to no startup cost. This has allowed more individuals to undertake 
non-employee work than ever before, often on a part-time basis. In addition, 
advances in technology have changed the way that business owners receive 
and make payments as well as how they track income and expenses. In the 
wake of these developments, the “old” small business tax regime is no longer 
a sensible model. This Part develops that argument—that the current regime 
is antiquated in the context of the gig economy—and proposes an alternative 
tax regime for gig workers. 
 
81 See Kyle D. Logue & Gustavo G. Vettori, Narrowing the Tax Gap Through Presumptive Taxation, 
2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 100, 108 (2011) (highlighting that “individuals who ran their own businesses as sole 
proprietorships in 2001 remitted, in the aggregate, only 43% of the income taxes they actually owed”). 
See generally Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Presumptive Collection: A Prospect Theory Approach to Increasing 
Small Business Tax Compliance, 67 TAX L. REV. 111, 112-13 (2013) (discussing the reasons for the disparity 
in the overall compliance rate between wage earners and the self-employed). 
82 Compare id. at 112 (suggesting noncompliance may be due to sole proprietors having more 
opportunities to evade), and Logue & Vettori, supra note 81, at 109 (same), with Phillips & Plumley, 
supra note 80, at 2 (noting that the complexity involved in meeting tax obligations is a factor in 
compliance), and Thomas, supra note 80, at 1526 (same). 
83 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, Commentary, Eight Truths About Collecting Taxes from the Cash 
Economy, 117 TAX NOTES 506, 514 (2007) (noting that “non-collection of tax due creates efficiency 
and fairness problems”); accord Susan Cleary Morse, Stewart Karlinsky & Joseph Bankman, Cash 
Business and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37, 48 (2009) (“Nonpayment of self-
employment taxes is estimated to comprise $39 billion, or sixteen percent of the gross tax gap, and 
is widely thought to be associated with underreporting of business income.”); Thomas, supra note 
81, at 113-14 (stating that “individual small business noncompliance . . . results in a significant 
revenue loss, causes an inequitable shift of the tax burden from noncompliant small businesses to 
compliant taxpayers, and distorts taxpayer preferences among different types of businesses”). 
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A. The “New” Small Business Owners: What’s Changed 
1. Tax Enforcement in the Old Economy 
Historically, the complexity of the small business tax regime made sense 
because of the nature of tax enforcement in the United States. The IRS relies 
heavily on third-party information reporting and tax withholding to make sure 
it collects taxes in a timely matter, and those mechanisms are highly effective.84 
For individual business owners, however, there traditionally has been no third 
party in place to act as a withholding agent or a reporter of information. 
Consider, for example, a restaurant owner whose revenue is derived from 
paying customers. Those customers cannot be expected to withhold taxes 
when they pay for their meal, nor can they be expected to issue 1099s to the 
restaurant owner reporting the amount they pay for a meal. So, in the case of 
business owners, the IRS has had to rely on a true voluntary compliance 
regime supplemented by deterrence mechanisms like audits and penalties. 
The restaurant owner is expected to keep careful records of his receipts and 
expenses, to make a detailed and honest return (facing a risk of audit and 
penalties if he does not comply), and to pay any tax due. The complexity 
associated with the business owner having to calculate and self-report his tax 
liability might be seen as a necessary evil to accurately taxing his net income. 
From the perspective of the restaurant owner, tax compliance obligations 
are an inevitable cost of doing business. In the same way that the owner incurs 
costs to rent and insure the restaurant space, to maintain a proper business 
license, and to hire staff, he will also expend resources to keep records and 
make the appropriate tax filings himself, or to retain the services of another 
person to do so. It is likely that the restaurant owner already has a 
bookkeeping system in place for his business, so keeping track of expenses 
and receipts for tax purposes may not entail much, if any, additional work 
that is not already being done for business purposes. He also is likely to have 
a segregated bank account for business earnings and a budget for regularly 
incurred expenses that include, but are not limited to, tax obligations. 
From the IRS’s perspective, the primary enforcement challenge for sole 
proprietors like our restaurant owner has historically been the use of cash.85 
Without information reporting and withholding, the restaurant owner is 
essentially self-reporting his income on an honor system. This makes tax 
evasion comparatively easy for small business owners since they have ample 
 
84 See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR 
THE YEARS 2008–2010 fig.1 (2016) (finding a 99 percent compliance rate when withholding is 
present and 93 percent compliance rate when “substantial information reporting” is present). 
85 See Thomas, supra note 81, at 113 (noting that “small businesses dealing in cash” can easily 
avoid “information reporting and withholding requirements”). 
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opportunity to conceal or conveniently forget about receipts, particularly cash 
receipts.86 Even in the unlikely event87 that the taxpayer is audited, the IRS 
has a much harder time detecting income when there is no paper trail. An 
unscrupulous restaurant owner could simply omit all or a portion of cash 
receipts from his books and records and, in most cases, would not get caught. 
The IRS’s compliance data from the past several decades reflects this reality. 
While the compliance rate among wage earners (who are subject to withholding 
and information reporting) is 99 percent, compliance among sole proprietors 
is below 50 percent.88 The data also indicates that the majority of evasion 
among business owners has traditionally involved understating cash receipts.89 
2.  Tax Enforcement in the New Economy 
Fast forward to the present. With the rise of the gig economy, the 
landscape has changed from both the taxpayer’s and the government’s 
perspective. Consider first the gig workers themselves. As discussed above, 
most of these workers earn relatively small amounts of income (often under 
$10,000) and use gig work to supplement other earnings.90 The ease of access to 
part-time gig work through online platforms, along with relatively low startup 
costs, suggests that these arrangements will only continue to proliferate. 
But for the most part, these new small businesses do not operate on the 
scale that many traditional “small”91 businesses do. A typical Uber driver, for 
example, has no employees, has little or no business experience, might not have 
a formal recordkeeping system, and likely does not have a segregated bank 
account for her business earnings.92 This means that tax compliance—which 
requires budgeting, making quarterly tax payments, and keeping detailed 
records—isn’t just a relatively minor cost of doing business as it may be for 
the restaurant owner. For the Uber driver, it likely requires significant 
 
86 The compliance rate among cash businesses has been estimated to be as low as 19 percent. 
See A Closer Look at the Size and Sources of the Tax Gap: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Taxation & 
IRS Oversight of the S. Comm. on Fin., 109th Cong. 14 (2006) (statement of J. Russell George, Treasury 
Inspector General for Tax Administration, U.S. Department of Treasury). 
87 In 2015, the IRS audited less than 3 percent of individual returns with business income under 
$1,000,000. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2015 DATA BOOK tbl.9a (2016). 
88 See Thomas, supra note 81, at 112. These percentages are based on the ratio of income actually 
reported to income that should have been reported. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 
84, at fig.1 n.2. 
89 See Thomas, supra note 81, at 113, 128 n.109 (stating that underreporting of gross income is 
much more prevalent than overstating deductions). 
90 See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text. 
91 The IRS’s definition of “small business” is one with receipts under $10 million. See Small 
Business and Self-Employed Tax Center, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/
small-businesses-and-self-employed-tax-center [https://perma.cc/TW7U-KJGU]. 
92 See supra subsection I.B.3. 
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additional time and effort that would not otherwise be expended but for the 
tax law. As a result, gig workers spend disproportionately large resources 
dealing with tax compliance obligations compared to relatively small amounts 
of income, a nonsensical result that may deter future participation in the gig 
economy or even foster tax evasion. 
The tax enforcement landscape is also changing in the small business 
sector in two notable ways. First, the use of cash is declining93 and, along with 
it, taxpayers’ ability to hide their receipts from the government.94 Second, 
and relatedly, the use of technology to facilitate payments for goods and 
services interjects third parties into transactions between buyers and 
sellers.95 An example of such a third party is the website Etsy, which offers 
an online marketplace for individuals to promote and sell handmade goods 
that consumers may browse and ultimately purchase. This is important from 
the government’s perspective because those third parties can provide 
information to the government about transactions in contexts where third 
party information reporting was previously not possible. Now, under the 
1099-K reporting requirements, credit card companies—and more recently 
platform companies—are an important source of information for the IRS to 
track business receipts.96 
Underreporting business receipts, which once was the primary source of 
tax evasion among small business owners, is thus becoming virtually 
impossible as third-party information reporting expands and the use of cash 
declines. Unfortunately, this doesn’t mean that tax evasion among business 
owners is obsolete. Rather, it appears that many determined tax evaders have 
simply adapted their methods to the new enforcement landscape. A recent 
study of the effect of 1099-K reporting demonstrates that many small business 
owners offset increases to their reported receipts by simply increasing their 
reported business deductions, resulting in little change to net income.97 The 
overstatement of deductions—previously a much smaller problem than 
 
93 See James Alm & Jay A. Soled, W(h)ither the Tax Gap?, 92 WASH. L. REV. 521, 531 (2017) 
(“The emergence of electronic currency as a means of payment strongly supports the proposition 
that the widespread use of cash to finance transactions may be coming to an end.”); see also Jeffrey 
H. Kahn & Gregg D. Polsky, The End of Cash, the Income Tax, and the Next 100 Years, 41 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 159, 163 (2014) (describing how e-payment technologies are reducing the need for cash). 
94 See id. at 163-65 (“E-payments automatically leave an electronic trail for every transaction, 
which decreases the risk of non-reporting of income.”). 
95 See id. at 165 (noting that e-payments must be made through a third-party intermediary). 
96 See supra subsection I.B.2. 
97 Joel Slemrod et al., Does Credit-Card Information Reporting Improve Small-Business Tax 
Compliance? 22-23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21412, 2015) (“[T]axpayers 
whose reported receipts rose due to Form 1099-K also increased expense reporting, substantially 
diminishing its effect on overall tax revenues, and possibly diminishing the effect on reporting 
compliance by offsetting more accurate receipts reporting with less accurate expense reporting.”). 
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understated receipts98—has essentially become the new tax enforcement 
challenge for the IRS in the wake of recent technological advancements. 
3. Examples of Tax Evasion 
Consider two hypothetical examples that illustrate the evolution of small 
business tax evasion. First, consider a restaurant owner who earned $400,000 
in gross receipts in a year, half ($200,000) of which was in cash. Assume the 
restaurant owner also had $150,000 of legitimate business expenses. A 
dishonest restaurant owner might intentionally omit much—or all—of the 
cash receipts from both his records and his tax return. Thus, when he reports 
his net income for tax purposes, he might report just $200,000 of gross 
receipts (omitting $200,000), and all $150,000 of his business expenses, 
resulting in net business income of $50,000, which would be subject to income 
and self-employment taxes.99 Although his true net business income from the 
restaurant was $250,000,100 the business owner’s underreporting of the cash 
income is unlikely to be detected by the IRS. 
Now consider an Uber driver who earned $12,500 in gross receipts from 
driving in the past year. In addition to having paid 20 percent of that amount 
in fees to Uber ($2500),101 assume the driver incurred $5000 of additional 
deductible business expenses during the year from gas and other car-related 
expenses. Because Uber will issue the driver a Form 1099-K reflecting the 
$12,500 of receipts, and will also send that information to the IRS, the driver 
does not have the option of reporting something less than $12,500 of gross 
receipts on Schedule C of her tax return. 
But if she is determined to cheat, she can instead fudge her expenses. She 
might report, for example, that she had $8000 of car-related expenses, for net 
business income of just $2000102 instead of $5000.103 If the driver is audited, 
the IRS might have an easier time detecting her dishonesty (particularly if 
her claimed expenses don’t match contemporaneous records) than in the case 
of the restaurant owner failing to report cash income. However, the odds of 
 
98 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
99 For income tax purposes, the $50,000 of net business income (along with other adjusted gross 
income) would be further reduced in arriving at taxable income by deductions like the 199A deduction, 
the standard deduction, or itemized deductions. See I.R.C. § 63 (2012) (defining “taxable income”). 
100 $400,000 (gross receipts) – $150,000 (business expenses) = $250,000 (net business income). 
101 The typical Uber commission is 20 percent, though it varies by city, and Uber also deducts 
other amounts, such as a “Safe Ride Fee.” See Oei & Ring, supra note 62, at 63. All of these fees paid 
to Uber are deductible by the driver from the gross amount on Form 1099-K. 
102 $12,500 (gross receipts) – $2500 (deductible fee to Uber) – $8000 (claimed car-related 
expenses) = $2,000 net business income. 
103 $12,500 (gross receipts) – $2500 (deductible fee to Uber) – $5000 (actual car-related 
expenses) = $5000 net business income. 
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the dishonest Uber driver being audited are very low, and she will likely 
succeed in paying less tax than she owes. 
These developments in technology and tax enforcement suggest a new 
way forward for taxing the gig economy, which is detailed in the next three 
sections. First, Congress and/or Treasury should clarify the application of 
section 6050W to platform companies and require information reporting on 
Form 1099-K for transactions that exceed $600, rather than the much higher 
$20,000/200 transaction threshold. Second, Congress should enact legislation 
that would allow for tax withholding on payments to gig workers who qualify 
for information reporting. Third, additional legislation should provide for a 
“standard business deduction” (SBD) that would take the place of tracking 
actual business expenses for gig workers earning receipts below a certain 
threshold. In combination, these modifications should improve tax 
compliance while drastically reducing the time and resources gig workers 
spend dealing with their tax obligations. 
B. Expanded Information Reporting 
Any tax reform proposal for gig economy workers must include expanded 
information reporting, an issue that has been raised by several other 
commentators.104 To briefly reiterate those arguments: information reporting 
is crucial to tax compliance; section 6050W’s application to platform 
companies is somewhat unclear;105 and Treasury or Congress could easily 
clarify that the obligations of platform companies to report income to 
independent contractors continue to be governed by the $600 threshold, 
rather than the much higher $20,000/200 transactions threshold.106 
Clarification of section 6050W would ensure that any gig worker who 
earns more than $600 from a platform company would receive a 1099 at the 
end of the year reporting her gross receipts. Not only would such third-party 
reporting aid in the government’s enforcement efforts, it would also greatly 
assist the gig workers themselves by serving as a method of recordkeeping. 
For now, it appears that at least some platform companies are already 
taking the position that 1099 reporting is required below the $20,000/200 
 
104 See, e.g., Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 1059 (“Legislators and regulators must act quickly to 
close loopholes as they arise,” with respect to 1099-K reporting); Oei & Ring, supra note 62, at 106 
(“It would also be easy to issue guidance on how the Form 1099-K rules apply to the ride sharing 
(and other sharing economy) platforms . . . .”); Kahn & Polsky, supra note 93, at 165 (“Section 6050W 
could easily be expanded to cover the information-reporting regime; the $20,000/200 transaction 
floor could be lowered to cover nearly all e-payment transactions.”). 
105 See supra subsection I.B.2. 
106 The $20,000 threshold was likely intended for third party payment processors like PayPal. 
See Erb, supra note 59. 
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transaction threshold107 and others may soon follow suit. Additionally, given 
the attention that the 1099-K reporting “loophole” has received and the ease 
with which it could be rectified, the odds of clarification in this area are 
high.108 The remainder of this Article thus assumes that information 
reporting for all payments to gig workers over the $600 threshold will be in 
place, and offers two additional proposals that should significantly improve 
tax compliance in this area. 
C. Non-Employee Withholding 
The compliance benefits of third-party information reporting are well 
documented.109 Because the IRS receives information reported by third 
parties, taxpayers have a strong incentive to report it and are highly likely to 
be caught if they do not.110 But withholding provides additional compliance 
benefits, along with efficiency advantages, that information reporting alone 
cannot provide. 
1. Why Withholding Matters 
While 1099 reporting may help independent contractors keep track of 
annual gross receipts, it does not ease the bulk of their tax compliance burden, 
which comes from (1) budgeting for and paying quarterly estimated taxes 
(addressed here) and (2) tracking expenses (addressed by the proposed SBD 
in the next Section). Paying quarterly income and self-employment taxes on 
independent contractor income requires an awareness of the obligation, an 
understanding of how to calculate those payments, and sufficient liquid funds 
to make the payments. 
Yet, as discussed above,111 gig workers may have a particularly difficult 
time dealing with their tax obligations because they tend to be inexperienced, 
are potentially illiquid, and often do not understand the tax rules that apply 
to them. Those who miss quarterly tax payments may owe estimated tax 
penalties, and those who cannot pay their balance due at the end of the year 
will owe additional penalties and interest.112 Even workers who are able to 
 
107 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
108 However, legislation proposed in the Senate in 2017, which would have required a $1000 
reporting threshold for all platform companies, was not enacted as part of the final tax reform bill. 
See NEW GIG Act of 2017, S. 1549, 115th Cong. (2017). 
109 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 84 (reporting a 93 percent compliance rate 
when “substantial information reporting” is present). 
110 See supra subsection I.B.2 (describing the process by which third parties issue year-end 
information statements). 
111 See supra subsection I.B.3. 
112 See supra note 72 (explaining the various penalties for failing to pay taxes). 
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come up with funds to pay their year-end tax burden may be forced to shift 
their consumption patterns or asset allocations to meet their obligations.113 
To address these concerns, Congress should enact legislation requiring 
platform companies to withhold income and self-employment taxes from gig 
workers’ gross earnings.114 
Withholding would eliminate a large segment of gig workers’ tax 
compliance obligations. Because a portion of their tax liability would be 
collected each time they were paid,115 most workers would have no obligation 
to pay quarterly estimated taxes.116 This would also mean those workers would 
not have to budget for taxes during the year and worry about coming up with 
sufficient funds to make quarterly payments or large year-end payments.117 
This is the treatment currently afforded to wage earners, most of whom do 
not have to worry about their tax compliance obligations during the year. 
In addition to reducing tax compliance burdens, withholding would 
enable workers to claim refunds when they file their tax returns. This is 
important because studies have demonstrated that taxpayers generally prefer 
receiving a refund as opposed to owing a balance, notwithstanding that there 
is generally no interest paid on tax refunds.118 Surveyed taxpayers indicate 
that they feel dread about owing a balance with their tax return, they feel 
anxiety about underestimating what they will owe, and that they experience 
enjoyment from getting a refund.119 Refunds may also serve as a form of 
 
113 See HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 8, at 18 (describing how tax payments and penalties 
“can cause fluctuations in consumption and asset allocations”). 
114 Legislation proposed in the Senate in 2017 would have required withholding by platform 
companies of 5 percent of gig workers’ gross earnings, on up to $20,000 of earnings. However, the 
withholding provision was not enacted as part of the final tax reform bill in 2017. See NEW GIG 
Act of 2017, S. 1549, 115th Cong. (2017). While 5 percent withholding would have been a step in the 
right direction, this rate may have been too low, as discussed further below. 
115 Gig workers, like any independent contractor, are generally paid periodically. See, e.g., Don 
Reisinger, Uber Will Instantly Pay Drivers in Need, FORTUNE (Mar. 17, 2016), http://fortune.com/
2016/03/17/uber-instant-pay/ [https://perma.cc/QG2H-RERU] (noting that Uber generally pays its 
drivers once per week, but also offers an “Instant Pay” feature, which allows some drivers to receive 
their share of passenger payments immediately). 
116 Those who earned significant amounts of income not subject to withholding from other 
sources may still owe estimated taxes. 
117 Oei and Ring found that some Uber-driver forum posters—who were also wage-earning 
employees—dealt with this issue by adjusting their withholding levels to cover additional taxes from 
gig work. Oei & Ring, supra note 62, at 97. 
118 See, e.g., Benjamin C. Ayers, Steven J. Kachelmeier & John R. Robinson, Why Do People 
Give Interest-Free Loans to the Government? An Experimental Study of Interim Tax Payments, 21 J. AM. 
TAX’N ASS’N 55, 71 (1999); Donna D. Bobek, Richard C. Hatfield & Kristin Wentzel, An 
Investigation of Why Taxpayers Prefer Refunds: A Theory of Planned Behavior Approach, 29 J. AM. TAX’N 
ASS’N 93, 108-09 (2007).  
119 See Bobek et al., supra note 118, at 99 (“Approximately 40 percent of respondents reported 
that they enjoyed receiving a refund and expressed ‘dread’ . . . at paying taxes when they file their 
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forced savings for lower income taxpayers, helping them purchase durable 
goods, such as appliances.120 Notably, taxpayers’ awareness about the 
economics of a tax refund (i.e., that the refund is essentially an interest-free 
loan to the government) does not appear to affect their preferences.121 Rather 
than constituting an irrational preference, it seems that the psychological 
benefits of receiving a refund outweigh its financial cost for many taxpayers.122 
There are also compliance benefits to tax refunds from the government’s 
perspective. Collecting taxes in advance will inevitably result in more taxes 
collected overall, as it will help some taxpayers overcome budgeting and 
liquidity issues. But beyond that benefit, numerous studies reveal that tax 
refunds actually result in more honest tax reporting, all other things being 
equal.123 This phenomenon is consistent with prospect theory, which 
generally predicts that individuals tend to be risk-seeking when facing a loss 
and they tend to be risk-averse when facing a gain.124 In the context of taxes, 
 
return.”); see also Ayers et al., supra note 118, at 56, 70 (finding that taxpayers prefer to overpay for 
various reasons, including inexperience and uncertainty). 
120 See Michael S. Barr & Jane K. Dokko, Paying to Save: Tax Withholding and Asset Allocation 
Among Low- and Moderate-Income Taxpayers 8 & n.5 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper 
No. 2008-11, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1327119 [https://perma.cc/
9ETG-32D6] (“Tax refunds may finance different types of consumption, such as durable goods 
purchases, if ‘mental accounting’ plays a role in individuals’ decision-making.”). 
121 See Bobek et al., supra note 118, at 93, 109. 
122 See id. at 109 (“Those who preferred to receive a refund perceived little financial benefit to 
reducing their withholding and were primarily influenced by emotional issues such as anxiety about 
unexpectedly owing money when they filed a tax return.”). 
123 See, e.g., Paul Corcoro & Peter Adelsheim, A Balance Due Before Remittance: The Effect on 
Reporting Compliance 1, 28, in RECENT RESEARCH ON TAX ADMINISTRATION AND COMPLIANCE: 
SELECTED PAPERS GIVEN AT THE 2010 IRS RESEARCH CONFERENCE (June 29-30, 2010) (“There 
is evidence that balance-due taxpayers have been found to understate their taxes more often than 
refund-due taxpayers.”); Richard Dusenbury, The Effect of Prepayment Position on Individual Taxpayers’ 
Preferences for Risky Tax-Filing Options, 16 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 1, 2 (1994) (“[T]axpayers selected 
significantly riskier filing positions and reported less income in the payment-due case than in the refund 
case.”); Henk Elffers & Dick J. Hessing, Influencing the Prospects of Tax Evasion, 18 J. ECON. 
PSYCHOL. 289, 291 (1997) (describing the psychological incentives for taxpayers regarding refunds); 
Henry S.J. Robben et al., Decision Frame and Opportunity as Determinants of Tax Cheating, 11 J. ECON. 
PSYCHOL. 341, 355 (1990) (“Noncompliance was more likely to occur, occurred on more occasions, and 
involved larger amounts of money among subjects confronting the prospect of an additional tax 
payment after withholding.”); A. Schepanski & T. Shearer, A Prospect Theory Account of the Income 
Tax Withholding Phenomenon, 63 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 174, 183-84 (1995) 
(describing the “withholding phenomenon” and that evidence “indicates that underwithholding has a 
greater effect on detracting from taxpayer compliance than overwithholding does on enhancing it”); see 
also Otto H. Chang, Donald R. Nichols & Joseph J. Schultz, Taxpayer Attitudes Toward Tax Audit Risk, 
8 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 299, 304 (1987) (discussing the prospect theory and suggesting that taxpayers 
“exhibit different tax evasion behaviors”); Per Engstrom et al., Tax Compliance and Loss Aversion, 7 AM. 
ECON. J. 132, 133 (2015) (studying Swedish taxpayers and finding that “[t]hose with a deficit would 
consequently be more inclined to take (legal or illegal) actions in order to reduce their tax liability”). 
124 See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
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this means individuals who face a balance due (a loss) are more likely to 
engage in risky behavior like tax evasion, while individuals claiming a refund 
(a gain) are more likely to play it safe and report honestly.125 Consistent with 
this theory, researchers have found that, across varying income levels and 
sources of income, taxpayers file more accurate returns if they are owed 
money and less accurate returns when they owe money to the government.126 
Thus, putting gig workers in a refund position when they file their tax return 
should result in more honest tax reporting by these workers. 
In addition to compliance benefits, withholding by platform companies is 
likely more efficient than a system under which each worker pays taxes on a 
quarterly basis. This is in part because the companies can take advantage of 
economies of scale that should make tax payments for multiple workers less 
costly in the aggregate.127 Additionally, the platform companies already have 
the systems in place (either internally or through an external payroll company) 
to withhold taxes for their fulltime employees, and already have some tax 
information for their independent contractors for purposes of issuing 1099s. 
While implementing withholding on top of information reporting may 
add some minor128 additional costs for the platform companies, the overall 
cost is surely lower than the collective cost incurred by gig workers under the 
current system. The availability of online payroll systems and other advances 
in technology in recent years also means that withholding can be 
accomplished at a lower cost than ever before.129 These cost savings would 
inure to the benefit of the government as well, which would now have a 
smaller group of players to monitor, and those players (the platform 
 
125 See Thomas, supra note 81, at 131-35 (applying Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory 
analysis to a taxpayer’s decision to comply or evade tax collection under various circumstances). 
126 See, e.g., Corcoro & Adelsheim, supra note 123, at 23 (“The individual is willing to 
underreport their tax liability to reduce a perceived loss when compared to the risk aversion to 
maintain a perceived gain.”); Thomas, supra note 81, at 138-39 (“[C]ompliance improves among all 
types of taxpayers when they face a refund as compared to a balance due.”). 
127 See Slemrod, supra note 27, at 263 (“[C]ost savings are more likely to be realized when the 
withholders are fewer in number than the taxpayers on whose behalf they are remitting the tax.”); 
see also HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 8, at 18 (“Tax withholding by intermediaries would reduce 
workers’ administrative burden of paying income and social insurance taxes . . . . [W]ithholding 
services provided by intermediaries would also be economically efficient and improve compliance 
with tax laws.”). 
128 See, e.g., “The Sharing Economy”: A Taxing Experience for New Entrepreneurs Part I: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Small Business, 114th Cong. 5 (2016) (testimony of Joseph V. Kennedy, Senior 
Fellow, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation) (“I suspect that in many cases, it will 
be fairly simple for the platform to alter its payroll system to withhold taxes from workers who do 
more than a threshold amount of business with them.”). 
129 See, e.g., Kahn & Polsky, supra note 93, at 159 (“Technological improvements have made 
third-party reporting and withholding more efficient, which has allowed these mechanisms to 
become more pervasively used.”). 
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companies) would be much more likely to have sophisticated recordkeeping 
and accounting systems in place.130 
Further, it is likely beneficial for the platform companies to take steps to 
ease the tax compliance burdens of their workers, even if it entails some 
additional cost.131 If workers feel uncertain or intimidated about the tax 
compliance costs132 associated with gig work, they may reduce their hours in 
response or be deterred from participating in gig work altogether. 
Indeed, one study of the effect of tax complexity on labor supply found that 
people reduce their work effort when it is harder for them to understand what 
their net wage will be.133 In the study, subjects were given a choice between taking 
part in a leisure activity or working on a task for wages.134 Some subjects saw the 
wage presented as a gross wage minus a tax (i.e., a “partitioned price”); in other 
words, they were required to figure out the net after-tax wage themselves.135 
Others were presented with net wage information (“inclusive price”) along with 
the partitioned price. The authors found that subjects were more willing to 
choose work over the leisure activity in the inclusive price condition, when their 
net wages were more transparent, and concluded that “[a]ny additional 
complexity in the wage description . . . decreases work participation.”136 
 
130 See Slemrod, supra note 27, at 266 (discussing the efficiency-enhancing role of firms in the 
tax withholding system). 
131 Some platform companies have indicated a desire to do more to help workers with tax 
compliance obligations, but that they are reluctant to do so. See, e.g., BRUCKNER, supra note 3, at 16 
(discussing Airbnb’s 2015 announcement that it would begin collecting and remitting state and local 
taxes in certain jurisdictions). This reluctance is understandable because tax withholding by platform 
companies may appear to be an admission of “employer” status, which could carry with it a whole host 
of unintended non-tax implications (the obligation to pay minimum wage and overtime, for example). 
132 See “The Sharing Economy”, supra note 128, at 4 (“Workers need to make a number of 
important decisions including . . . how much to withhold . . . . They need to determine what 
expenses are deductible and begin keeping the necessary records. And they need to complete their 
tax filings in a timely manner.”). 
133 Andrew T. Hayashi, Brent K. Nakamura & David Gamage, Experimental Evidence of Tax 
Salience and the Labor-Leisure Decision: Anchoring, Tax Aversion, or Complexity?, 41 PUB. FIN. REV. 
203, 217 (2013). 
134 The subjects faced varying presentations of their wages that all resulted in the same net 
amount: some were offered a lower wage with no tax, others with offered a higher wage subject to a 
flat or progressive tax, and some were offered a lower wage with a bonus. Id. at 207-08. A second 
experiment varied the net wage. Id. 
135 Id. at 210. 
136 Id. at 214. The authors of the study also concluded that the result was most likely due to 
cognitive limitations, rather than preferences for price descriptions (like a preference for a bonus 
over a tax), because complicating the wage description lowered work effort regardless of whether it 
was presented as a lower wage plus a bonus or a higher wage minus a tax. Id. at 217; see also Johannes 
Abeler & Simon Jäger, Complex Tax Incentives, 7 AM. ECON. J. 1, 24-25 (2015) (finding that subjects 
have a harder time optimizing their compensation when they are subject to a complicated tax system 
as compared to when they are subject to a simpler system). 
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The study’s findings are relevant to gig workers because tax withholding 
essentially provides workers with an inclusive wage presentation. Every time 
they receive their paychecks, they can view which portion went to taxes and 
what their net compensation is.137 In contrast, when workers receive gross 
payments not subject to withholding, they must estimate the tax liability 
themselves. This is even more complicated than the partitioned price condition 
in the study (which lowered work effort),138 because many workers don’t even 
know what the appropriate tax rate will be. Thus, it is possible the uncertainty 
and complexity associated with receiving gross compensation payments 
actually reduce labor supply and that tax withholding can mitigate this effect. 
Lastly, there is a precedent for requiring tax withholding by platform 
companies. At least twelve countries in the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) require withholding on some 
payments to independent contractors.139 And on an analogous front, Airbnb 
has begun collecting local hotel and occupancy taxes for property owners in 
some cities, a move that apparently has helped them curry favor with state 
and local governments.140 
 
137 However, withholding is just a form of paying estimated taxes upfront; taxpayers are 
required to reconcile their year-end tax liability with what they have paid through withholding at 
the end of the year. In that sense, withholding doesn’t necessarily reflect a true net wage. One study 
found that high withholding rates (20 or 50 percent) had a negative effect on work effort, possibly 
because people confuse high withholding rates with high marginal tax rates. See Johannes Becker, 
Jonas Fooken & Melanie Steinhoff, Behavioral Effects of Withholding Taxes on Labor Supply 6-7, 21 
(Sch. of Econ., Univ. of Queensland Discussion Papers Series No. 589, 2018), 
http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/abstract/589.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RST-3NZB]. 
But to the extent that withholding puts taxpayers in a refund position (which it does for most 
people), it seems that any discrepancies between prepaid taxes and actual tax liability won’t impose 
the same kinds of psychological costs on taxpayers that estimating their taxes from gross wages does. 
Notably on this point, the study by Becker, Fooken, and Steinhoff found that work effort, while 
decreasing after imposition of high withholding taxes, increased in the period after receipt of a 
refund. Id. at 16. 
138 In the study, the partitioned wage condition description did not calculate the net wage for the 
subject, but the pertinent tax or bonus information was provided. Hayashi et al., supra note 133, app. 2. 
139 Slemrod, supra note 27, at 263. The OECD is a group of thirty-five countries with high 
levels of economic development. 
140 See Airbnb: Generating $2 Billion in Potential Tax Revenue for America’s Cities, AIRBNB CITIZEN 
(Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.airbnbaction.com/airbnb-generating-2-billion-in-potential-tax-revenue-
for-americas-cities [https://perma.cc/869E-FNXD]; see also Alison Griswold, Why Airbnb Desperately 
Wants to Pay Hotel Taxes, SLATE (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/
2015/02/airbnb_hotel_taxes_why_does_the_sharing_economy_startup_want_to_pay_them.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q7U7-JAMR] (describing Airbnb’s motivations for tax collection, including the 
opportunity to gain the favor of local governments). 
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2. Details of the Proposal 
As discussed above, the current tax rules require that employers withhold 
income taxes and payroll taxes on wages paid to employees, but there is no 
such requirement for payments to independent contractors. Thus, under the 
current regime, whether platform companies must withhold taxes on 
payments to gig workers depends entirely on whether the workers are 
independent contractors or employees. Although there may be many valid 
reasons to classify gig workers as employees141 or to create a new, third 
category of worker that is a hybrid of the two,142 resolving that issue is beyond 
the scope of this Article. Additionally, from a practical perspective, it may 
take many years before the legal disputes are resolved.143 
But the stakes of tax withholding do not have to be so high. Congress 
could enact legislation providing specifically for non-employee withholding on 
certain payments to independent contractors. This change would require 
withholding regardless of the classification of gig workers as employees or 
independent contractors, and could be enacted in the short-term without 
having to account for the multitude of non-tax considerations wrapped up in 
employee status. As discussed further below, workers who do not want their 
taxes withheld would be able to opt out or elect to reduce their withholding 
amounts. 
a. Scope of Withholding 
Non-employee withholding would not have to be limited to the gig 
economy. While large platform companies like Uber and Etsy are good 
candidates for acting as withholding agents, those independent contractors who 
don’t technically qualify as “gig workers” should also be able to partake in the 
benefits of withholding.144 However, carving out the proper scope of withholding 
for independent contractors requires defining a dollar threshold, identifying the 
 
141 Some commentators have pointed out that gig workers receive no protection from 
workplace discrimination. See, e.g., HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 8, at 7 (discussing the different 
“protections and benefits . . . at stake” depending on whether one is classified as en employee or 
independent contractor). 
142 See supra note 23 (detailing a framework to create a third category of worker called 
“independent worker”). 
143 See, e.g., Maya Kosoff, Why the “Sharing Economy” Keeps Getting Sued, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 9, 2017), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/11/postmates-worker-classification-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/L7JB-
RMUF] (describing a litany of lawsuits involving the employment status of gig workers, including 
workers at GrubHub, Uber, Lyft, and Postmates). 
144 On the other hand, withholding should not apply to credit card companies or payment 
processors like PayPal or Google Checkout. Although those entities may be subject to 1099-K 
reporting requirements, they have a much more tenuous relationship with workers (e.g., less control 
over the worker) as compared to platform companies. See Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 1036 
(discussing the distinction between platform companies and payment processors). 
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payers that are required to withhold, and identifying the payees for whom 
withholding is required. A sensible starting point here is section 6041 of the Code, 
which establishes a similar framework for 1099-MISC information reporting. 
First, there should be a de minimis threshold under which withholding is 
not required. A logical approach is to use the same $600 threshold that exists 
for 1099-MISC reporting;145 in other words, withholding would only be 
required once gross payments to an independent contractor reach at least 
$600 for the year. This would exempt very small one-off payments to 
independent contractors. Payers that anticipated an ongoing relationship 
with a service provider or seller of goods could begin withholding with the 
first payment even if it was under the threshold, though there would be no 
penalty for failing to do so. 
In terms of identifying the relevant payers, independent contractor 
withholding should apply only to payments made in the course of the payer’s 
business, meaning it would not be required of individuals who are purchasing 
goods or services for personal purposes.146 For example, a business that hires 
a handyman to make occasional repairs would withhold taxes in addition to 
the issuing a 1099-MISC to the handyman (as currently required). An 
individual hiring a house painter for her personal residence, on the other 
hand, would not be required to withhold (nor is she required to issue a 1099 
under the current tax law). 
In terms of identifying the relevant payees, the goal would be to identify 
individual workers and not business entities that may also have their own 
withholding obligations in the same transaction. For example, a law firm that 
hires Uber to drive its employees home should not be required to withhold 
taxes on its payment to Uber, but Uber should be required to withhold on its 
payment to the driver. A simple, albeit imperfect, way to address this is to 
require withholding only on payments to individual payees and not entities. 
Section 6041 has a similar rule that exempts payments to corporations from 
information reporting. The rule proposed here would be broader in that it 
would also exempt businesses operating in other entity forms (e.g., a Limited 
Liability Company). Presumably, the vast majority of gig workers and other, 
 
145 See I.R.C. § 6041(a) (2000); see also About Form 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income (Info Copy 
Only), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1099-misc-
miscellaneous-income [https://perma.cc/57LK-KG5S]. 
146 The withholding legislation could be similar in scope to the rule for information reporting 
to independent contractors under section 6041, which applies only to business payments and 
contains certain other exemptions. However, there does not appear to be a good justification to 
exempt payments for goods, as the section 6041 rules do. For example, a company like Etsy that 
makes payments to artists who sell goods should still be required to withhold. 
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small independent contractors are not operating as entities and thus would 
be able to benefit from withholding.147 
b. Self-Employment Taxes 
Independent contractor withholding should cover workers’ self-
employment tax obligations, but should not impose separate payroll tax 
obligations on the payers. Economically, it probably doesn’t matter who is 
nominally responsible for payroll taxes; if the platform company (or other 
payer) were responsible for half of those taxes, they would likely reduce gross 
payments to workers to compensate.148 However, there is good reason not to 
impose nominal payroll tax burdens on businesses that pay independent 
contractors. Such a requirement would require additional legislation and would 
further blur the employee/independent contractor distinction. A requirement 
to pay employment taxes would also likely result in much more resistance to 
withholding in general from platform companies and other affected parties. 
c. Setting an Appropriate Rate 
The most significant consideration in designing a non-employee 
withholding rule is the proper withholding rate. Too much withholding would 
leave workers strapped for cash, which in turn may deter work effort. Not 
enough withholding could leave workers in the position of owing estimated 
taxes and hefty year-end balances, largely obviating the benefit of withholding. 
Choosing a withholding rate depends on several factors: the worker’s 
expected annual income, her expected deductions, and her marginal tax rate. 
In the context of wage withholding, the IRS uses proxies to help estimate 
these three factors. First, the IRS projects expected income by annualizing 
the employee’s periodic payments. For example, an employee who receives 
a monthly gross paycheck of $1000 will be treated as if she earns $12,000 in 
gross wages annually. Second, expected deductions are taken into account 
by having employees fill out Form W-4 and claim allowances for certain 
things like dependents, spouses, and child care expenses, which approximate 
personal exemptions and other deductions.149 Finally, using the employee’s 
projected income and the number of allowances, IRS withholding tables 
 
147 Concerns about single member Limited Liability Companies could be assuaged by allowing 
those independent contractors the option to opt in to withholding. 
148 In the employment context, the economic burden of the employer’s share of payroll taxes 
is generally considered to be borne by the employees. See HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 8, at 25. 
149 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM W-4 (2017). Under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra 
note 37, personal exemptions are repealed for tax years 2018–2025, which will require a new version 
of Form W-4. 
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apply marginal tax brackets to determine the amount that employers should 
withhold from each paycheck.150 
There are, of course, instances where wage withholding is not accurate. 
For example, Form W-4 does a poor job accounting for marriage penalties for 
two working spouses making similar incomes. Moreover, employees who 
leave a job and stop earning income mid-year will pay withholding taxes as if 
they earned a year’s worth of salary, and they cannot get their overpayment 
refunded until they file their tax return the following year. But for the most 
part, the government’s wage withholding proxies are successful in achieving 
their desired goal: approximating tax liability and slightly over-withholding.151 
In theory, these same general principles should apply in calculating 
withholding for gig workers and other independent contractors. But 
approximating annual earnings, expected deductions, and applicable marginal 
tax rates can be significantly more challenging for independent contractors 
than for wage earners. This is partly because the former may have income 
from multiple jobs, and withholding from each payer won’t necessarily take 
into account payments from other sources. Additionally, wage earners 
frequently receive level, periodic payments, which makes calculating an 
annualized salary fairly simple. In contrast, even aside from receiving 
payments from multiple payers, the potential lumpiness of independent 
contractor income makes estimating annual earnings more challenging. 
Another difficulty stems from the fact that independent contractors may 
incur significantly more deductible expenses than wage earners because they 
can deduct their business expenses and potentially claim a section 199A 
deduction. These deductions aren’t accounted for in the allowances listed on 
Form W-4, even though they may significantly reduce taxable income. As a 
result, if the current W-4 were used, many independent contractors would be 
significantly over-withheld. 
In light of these issues, a form other than the W-4 should be used for 
independent contractor withholding. Additionally, because it is much more 
difficult to estimate taxable income from independent contractor payments, 
withholding should be set at a fixed rate of gross receipts, rather than relying 
on the existing employee withholding tables. Accordingly, the remainder of 
this subsection discusses a proposal for a schedule of non-employee 
withholding rates, where one rate in the schedule would apply to all of an 
independent contractor’s gross receipts. As detailed below, the gross receipts 
withholding rates are derived by: 1) having taxpayers project their net 
 
150 U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 15, CAL NO. 10000W, 
(CIRCULAR E), EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE 44-47 (2018). 
151 See Thomas, supra note 81, at 142 n.180 (explaining that wage withholding tables are 
designed to intentionally over-withhold). 
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business income for the year; 2) choosing a marginal tax rate that is based on 
the taxpayer’s projected net income; and 3) estimating a net, taxable portion of 
each gross payment by assuming a fixed profit ratio of 40 percent (which would 
apply in all cases). The goal is to have withholding cover all of taxpayers’ 
income and self-employment tax obligations and provide a modest refund. 
d. Calculating Self-Employment and Income Taxes Based on Net Income 
Withholding on a gross payment to an independent contractor would 
ideally collect the portion of the payment that is taxable. But because our tax 
system doesn’t tax gross receipts, a proper withholding scheme must be able 
to derive net, taxable income from each gross payment. In other words, to 
collect the appropriate amount of tax, we must be able to determine: (1) how 
much of each gross payment represents net income and (2) how much tax is 
owed on that net income. 
i. Estimating Net Income 
A relatively simple approach to estimate net business income is to look at 
historic net profit ratios for Schedule C filers and apply an average profit 
ratio152 to all taxpayers’ gross receipts. The IRS’s Statistics of Income 
Division publishes relevant information for sole proprietors grouped by 
sector (e.g., food and beverage sales, legal services, laundry services). Across 
all sectors of non-farm sole proprietorships, the average profit ratio is 
approximately 22.7 percent.153 However, the overall average takes into account 
various industries (such as retail stores and warehouses) that may not be relevant 
for this purpose, as many of those industries might have lower profit ratios than 
would be expected for gig workers and other small sole proprietorships. 
Additionally, many larger Schedule C filers are included in the overall average, 
and those businesses incur expenses like employee payroll expenses that would 
not be typical of gig workers and other small sole proprietors. 
When considering just those sectors most likely to encompass gig workers 
and other small independent contractors, and eliminating payroll expenses, the 
weighted average net profit ratio for sole proprietors rises to approximately 40 
 
152 As used here, profit ratio means the ratio of net income (gross receipts minus business 
expenses) to gross receipts. For example, a business with $10,000 of receipts and $6,000 of expenses 
would have a profit ratio of 40 percent. 
153 See SOI Tax Stats, Nonfarm Sole Proprietorship Statistics, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-nonfarm-sole-proprietorship-statistics [https://perma.cc/P9C2-
27PF] (analyzing Table 1, Nonfarm Sole Properietorships: Business Receipts, Selected Deductions, 
Payroll, and Net Income, by Industrial Sectors, Tax 2014). 
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percent.154 This is consistent with a recent study of self-employed 
taxpayers conducted by the Office of Tax Analysis (OTA), in which 
average profit ratios were approximately 38 percent for sole proprietors 
with more than $5000 in expenses.155 However, it should be noted that for 
taxpayers who specifically identified as gig workers in the OTA study, 
profit ratios were closer to 30 percent.156 
Using a profit ratio of 40 percent instead of 30 percent to calculate 
withholding for gig workers could result in over-withholding for some of 
those workers, which may or may not be desirable (as discussed further 
below). To address this potential inaccuracy, policymakers could calculate 
different withholding schedules for gig workers versus non-gig workers. 
Taking this approach to the extreme, they could also calculate different 
withholding schedules on a sector-by-sector basis, which would be more 
accurate but entail more complexity. But because the withholding scheme 
proposed here is optional for taxpayers, and because it would be vastly 
simpler, this Article proposes that one presumed profit ratio of 40 percent 
should apply to all independent contractors. If policymakers deem it 
 
154 Calculations showing weighted net profit ratios after exclusion for payroll expenses are on 
file with the author and are based on 2014 data made publicly available by the IRS. Id. Sectors 
considered were: non-store retailers; lessors of real estate; couriers and messengers; transit and 
ground transportation; specialized design services; computer systems design services; other 
professional, scientific and technical services; consulting services; other miscellaneous services; 
personal and laundry; miscellaneous repairs; and unclassified establishments. 
Grouping workers by industrial sector classification is probably not a well-targeted way to 
summarize aggregate data for gig workers, but for now, it’s the only sector-based data publicly 
available from the IRS. Each of the sectors listed here likely encompasses many businesses that are 
not related to gig employment, particularly for vague categories like “unclassified” and 
“miscellaneous” businesses. Additionally, taxpayers self-select sector classification and, thus, some 
gig workers may misclassify themselves or otherwise choose sectors not listed here. 
155 Jackson et al., supra note 15, at 34 tbl.6. The OTA study separates sole proprietors with 
significant business expenses (over $5000) from those without significant business expenses (less 
than $5000) and reveals an interesting trend. For taxpayers who were either primarily self-employed 
or earning a mix of employment and self-employment income, profit ratios were 38 percent for those 
with significant expenses. However, for those without significant expenses, profit ratios were 
approximately 90 percent, likely reflecting those taxpayers engaged in low-cost, labor-intensive 
industries. Overall profit ratios, taking into account both the significant expense group and the 
insignificant expense group, were 49 percent for those with mixed wage/self-employment income 
and 44 percent for those who earned primarily self-employment income, which is still somewhat in 
line with the 40 percent average discussed above. See id. (analyzing data provided for in Table 6). 
Overall, this means that taxpayers in the low expense group would likely be under-withheld if a 40 
percent profit ratio were assumed. 
156 See id. (based on ratio of profits to gross receipts). However, the authors of the study 
acknowledge certain limitations with respect to the data on gig workers. First, the data omits gig 
workers who did not receive a Form 1099 from a platform company or who did not self-identify as 
a gig worker by naming a specific platform or using a specific phrase (e.g., “ride sharing”). Id. at 15. 
Second, income and expense data for gig workers may also include other, non-gig work. Id. 
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preferable to limit withholding to only gig workers, a 30 percent presumed 
profit ratio may be more appropriate. 
A presumed profit ratio of 40 percent allows any gross receipts payment 
to be easily converted into net profit for purposes of calculating withholding. 
For example, if a gig worker received a $1000 payment from a platform 
company, $400 would be presumed to be net income. The next step is to 
calculate the amount of tax that should be withheld from the presumed profit. 
ii. Calculating Tax Liability on Presumed Net Income 
The proper withholding amount can be calculated based on a combination 
of self-employment tax and income tax rates. Taxpayers must report and pay 
self-employment taxes at a rate of 15.3 percent on net business income, 
although the net income subject to self-employment tax is reduced slightly 
because taxpayers can deduct half of their potential self-employment tax 
liability from net business income before calculating their self-employment 
tax.157 For purposes of simplicity, this discussion assumes that a 15 percent 
self-employment tax rate applies to all of the taxpayer’s net business income. 
In addition to self-employment tax, taxpayers must pay income tax at the 
applicable marginal rates provided under the Code. The appropriate income tax 
rate for purposes of withholding can be determined by asking taxpayers to project 
their net earnings at the beginning of the year and using the highest applicable 
marginal tax rate. For example, if a single taxpayer projects that he will earn 
$70,000, the appropriate marginal income tax rate is 22 percent for 2018.158 
We can then combine income and self-employment tax rates to determine 
a total tax rate on gross receipts. For example, for a taxpayer who projects she 
will earn $70,000 (putting her in the 22 percent income tax bracket), her total 
tax rate for purposes of withholding will be 37 percent (15 percent for self-
employment tax plus 22 percent for income tax). 
Finally, by combining the 40 percent presumed profit ratio and the total 
tax rate, we can derive a single, flat rate to withhold on gross receipts for each 
marginal income tax bracket. For the taxpayer in the preceding paragraph 
with a total tax rate of 37 percent, the appropriate withholding rate would be 
15 percent of gross receipts (37 percent times 40 percent). 
Table 1 provides the appropriate rate of withholding (right column) for a 
range of marginal income tax rates (left column), the latter of which would 
be based on the taxpayer’s projected earnings. 
 
 
157 The result of the deduction for half of potential self-employment tax liability is that the 
15.3 percent self-employment tax rate is applied to 92.35 percent of net business income. See supra 
note 32 (discussing the self-employment tax). 
158 See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra note 37, § 11001 (creating new tax brackets). 
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e. Implementation Details 
To summarize, an appropriate withholding rate on gross receipts should 
be between 6 and 16 percent (under the assumptions discussed above).161 For 
simplicity, policymakers might choose just one flat withholding rate—say 10 
percent—for all gross receipts. The Taxpayer Advocate, Nina Olson, 
recommended a similar approach in her 2003 report to Congress.162 The 
Obama Administration also recommended withholding for independent 
 
159 Calculated as follows: [15 percent + Projected Marginal Tax Rate] x 40 percent, rounded to 
the nearest whole number. 
160 A taxpayer who projects that his income will be less than or equal to the standard deduction 
would be considered to be in the zero bracket for income tax purposes. However, self-employment 
tax applies to net business income without any offset for below-the-line deductions. For example, a 
gig worker who earns only $10,000 will owe no income tax but will still owe self-employment tax. 
161 Higher marginal rates on incomes over $157,500 have been omitted for this purpose because 
most gig workers are not earning that much income. 
162 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 257-58 (Dec. 31, 
2003). The report recommends a 5 percent withholding rate on “payments to independent 
contractors not generally maintaining an inventory or receiving payments for materials and 
supplies”; a 3.5 percent rate is recommended for those with inventories. Id. at 257. The 2005 Report 
to Congress recommends a similar regime that would be voluntary. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 
2005 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 391-393 (Dec. 31, 2005). The rates in the 2003 Taxpayer 
Advocate Report were calculated based on IRS data using a similar methodology to the one 
employed here, using an average profit of 22 percent for sole proprietors with inventories (based on 
IRS data) and an average profit of 29 percent for those without inventories, and multiplying that 
profit by 15 percent for self-employment tax. “The Sharing Economy: A Taxing Experience for New 
Entrepreneurs”: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Business, 114th Cong. 14 (2016) (statement of 
Nina E. Olsen, National Taxpayer Advocate). 
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contractors on gross receipts, but under a voluntary regime where the payee 
could choose from a range of rates between 15 percent and 35 percent of gross 
receipts.163 However, those rates may be too high for many workers, unless 
realistic net profit ratios are much higher than the 40 percent average assumed 
here.164 On the other hand, a recent Senate proposal for mandatory 
withholding by platform companies at a flat rate of 5 percent would likely 
have resulted in under-withholding for many gig workers.165 
Instead of choosing one flat rate, a more accurate approach that would not 
entail too much additional administrative complexity would be to vary the 
withholding rate based on the taxpayer’s projected earnings. The taxpayer 
would fill out a form similar to Form W-4, which would ask her to project her 
annual earnings from any source, including any net business income and wage 
income. Although it might be hard for independent contractors, especially 
relatively inexperienced ones, to estimate their projected net business 
income, they would only have to produce a reasonable estimate within a range 
as wide as the marginal tax brackets. 
For example, the form could have taxpayers check a box asking which of 
the following categories they expect their combined net business income and 
wages to fall into: 0–$12,000; $12,001–$22,000; $22,001–$50,000; etc.166 
Choosing a projected net income amount would surely be easier for taxpayers 
than asking them to choose an appropriate withholding rate, which might be 
confusing and daunting. The payer would then withhold at the appropriate 
rate using an IRS table based on figures like those in Table 1. 
The withholding table should take into account the standard deduction, 
which would mitigate the potential to collect too much tax. Self-employment 
tax, however, applies to net business income before any offset for the standard 
deduction, so self-employment taxes would still be withheld. For example, a 
single taxpayer earning only $10,000 per year from gig work with no wages or 
other income would not be subject to income tax but should still be subject 
to withholding (at a 6 percent rate) to cover self-employment tax. 
 
163 See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S 
FISCAL YEAR 2017 REVENUE PROPOSALS 199 (Feb. 2016). It should be noted that past legislative 
proposals to impose mandatory independent contractor withholding have not had success. For 
example, in 2011, Congress repealed prospective legislation that would have imposed withholding at 
a rate of 3 percent of gross receipts on payments to government contractors over $10,000. See Pub. 
L. No. 112-56, 125 Stat. 711 (2011). 
164 For example, at a marginal tax rate of 12 percent, withholding 25 percent of gross receipts 
would assume a net profit ratio of 92.5 percent. [(15 percent + 12 percent) x 92.5 percent = 25 percent.] 
165 See supra note 114. 
166 Because the withholding rates proposed here would be based on the taxpayer’s highest 
marginal income tax rate, the categories should roughly approximate (or could exactly equal) the 
marginal tax brackets. Thus, for example, since the 22 percent marginal tax bracket covers taxable 
incomes between $38,701 and $82,500 for 2018 (for single filers), it wouldn’t matter for purposes of 
withholding if a gig worker projected he’d earn $60,000 of net income but actually earned only $50,000. 
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Even under an approach that varies the withholding rate based on the 
taxpayer’s projected income, the withholding rates in Table 1 may still be too 
high. One reason is that the rates in Table 1 are based on the taxpayer’s 
(projected) highest marginal tax rate, which will likely overtax net income, 
since lower marginal rates may apply to the first dollars of that income. A 
second reason is that the withholding scheme proposed here only takes into 
account business deductions (using an assumed 40 percent profit ratio) and the 
standard deduction, but does not take into account any other above-the-line 
deductions or itemized deductions. 
Further, new Code section 199A deduction adds another layer of 
complexity and potential inaccuracy to withholding. For workers who 
derive all of their income from gig work (or other non-employee work), the 
deduction may167 apply to their entire net income,168 which would be 
relatively simple to factor into a withholding calculation. (Estimated net 
income would simply be reduced by 20 percent.) But because the section 
199A deduction does not apply to employment income, it would be difficult 
to adjust the total net income of workers who earn a combination of 
employment and non-employment income. This might not matter for 
many workers: as long as the section 199A deduction doesn’t move the 
taxpayer from one marginal bracket to another, the withholding 
calculation would not be impacted. But it is possible that some taxpayers 
at the bottom of one bracket would be moved to a lower bracket by virtue 
of the section 199A deduction, and not accounting for this could result in 
significant over-withholding.169 
On the one hand, these potential inaccuracies may not be troubling, 
especially since wage withholding also doesn’t take into account a number of 
deductions.170 In fact, not accounting for every deduction is largely how the 
IRS wage withholding tables achieve over-withholding for the majority of 
taxpayers, providing the highly popular tax refund.171 However, these factors 
may be good reason to err on the low side when setting a range of withholding 
 
167 But for some workers, the deduction will be 20 percent of taxable income, which will be 
less than 20 percent of net gig income. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
168 This assumes the worker earns less than the $157,500/$315,000 threshold. See supra note 44 
and accompanying text. 
169 As an example, consider a single gig worker with $60,000 of net earnings from gig work. 
After the standard deduction and a deduction for half of self-employment tax, the worker would 
have $43,761 of taxable income, putting her in the 22 percent tax bracket. But factoring in the 199A 
deduction would mean an additional $8752 deduction (20 percent of $43,761, since this is less than 
20 percent of $60,000), resulting in $35,009 of taxable income, putting her in the 12 percent tax 
bracket. For the 2018 standard deduction and tax brackets, see Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra note 37, 
§§ 11001, 11021. 
170 See Thomas, supra note 81, at 142. 
171 Id. 
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rates. Policymakers may decide, for example, to withhold at only 12 or 13 
percent for those in the 22 and 24 percent brackets, and only 8 or 9 percent 
for those in the 10 and 12 percent brackets.172 
f. Opt-Out 
If withholding rates are too high, independent contractors may face 
serious liquidity constraints until they receive their tax refund. Other 
independent contractors may prefer to handle estimated tax payments on their 
own without interference from the government; this may be particularly true 
of experienced business owners or those with seasonal income fluctuations. To 
address these concerns, Congress should make non-employee withholding 
optional for the payee. The form that a worker provides to the payer could 
contain an additional line that allows the worker to elect no withholding, or to 
provide a reduced (or increased) withholding rate of her choice. 
Importantly, withholding at rates provided by the government should be 
the default. In other words, workers would be given the option to opt out of 
withholding or to change their withholding rate, but would be subject to the 
withholding regime described above if they did not make an affirmative 
election. This would ensure that workers who chose not to have their taxes 
withheld were expressing a true preference, rather than exhibiting a status 
quo bias.173 Since withholding would only apply to individual taxpayers, 
workers could also opt out simply by forming an entity. 
The downside of optionality is that, if a significant number of workers 
opted out of withholding, then the compliance, efficiency, and revenue benefits 
would be diminished. On the other hand, making withholding elective would 
allow those who do not prefer withholding and/or receiving a refund to opt out, 
leaving in place a regime that better reflects overall preferences. Such a regime 
may also be more accurate if the taxpayers who opt out tend to be the ones who 
make little or no profit and don’t ultimately owe taxes. 
The withholding regime proposed here would greatly simplify the tax 
compliance obligations of gig workers (and other independent contractors) 
and should improve compliance. Rather than having to budget for taxes, make 
estimated tax payments, and deal with significant year-end balances, gig 
 
172 Another “back-of-the-envelope” method to account for the new section 199A deduction 
would be to reduce all projected marginal income tax rates by 20 percent. For example, a taxpayer 
projected to be in the 22 percent tax bracket (based on her estimated net income) would instead be 
projected to have a marginal income tax rate of 17.6 percent. Adding 15 percent for self-employment 
tax would result in a total tax rate of 32.6 percent, which would reduce projected withholding from 
15 percent (see Table 1 above) to 13 percent. The same calculation could be done for each marginal 
income tax rate in Table 1. 
173 For a discussion of the status quo bias, see generally Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & 
Richard Thaler, The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991). 
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workers would have a small percentage of their gross receipts withheld each 
time they were paid (once a de minimis threshold was exceeded). For most gig 
workers, the obligation to make any estimated tax payments during the year 
would vanish, as withholding would satisfy their income and self-employment 
tax obligations. And at the end of the year, most would claim a tax refund 
with their tax return, in line with taxpayer preferences. 
D. The Standard Business Deduction 
Although withholding could virtually eliminate the budgeting and 
complexity issues associated with paying estimated and year-end taxes for 
many gig workers, the burden of tracking business expenses and reporting 
them on a tax return would remain. The latter issue is addressed in this 
Section by the proposal for a standard business deduction (SBD). The SBD 
would be a fixed amount—based on a percentage of gross receipts—that could 
be deducted in lieu of actual business expenses. It would, therefore, eliminate 
the need to track and report those expenses. 
1. Why Allow a Standard Business Deduction? 
When it comes to gig workers deducting business expenses, the current 
tax regime presents three significant compliance issues for these taxpayers. 
First, the rules are confusing and taxpayers may make mistakes. Those mistakes 
are probably in the taxpayer’s favor on balance (i.e., they are revenue losers).174 
Second, expenses are reported on an honor system and taxpayers may be 
tempted to cheat. Third, expense tracking and reporting is time-consuming and 
burdensome, even for taxpayers who are familiar with the rules. The SBD 
would mitigate each of these issues, reducing evasion and unintentional 
noncompliance and virtually eliminating tax recordkeeping requirements for 
many small businesses. 
Surveys of gig workers have revealed that many have no idea what sorts 
of costs are deductible from their business receipts or how to properly record 
their expenses.175 It should be noted, however, that there are already some 
simplification measures built into the tax law to mitigate the complexity 
associated with business deductions. For example, taxpayers who use their car 
for business purposes can elect to take the standard mileage deduction in lieu 
of deducting actual car-related expenses and depreciation; this simplified rule 
allows taxpayers to deduct an amount equal to their total business miles 
 
174 See Phillips & Plumley, supra note 80, at 29 (discussing studies of audit data for over 55,000 
taxpayers from 2006 to 2010 which found that, although many taxpayers report an amount close to 
their actual tax liability, they tend to slightly underreport, rather than overreport). 
175 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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driven multiplied by a rate set by the IRS (currently $0.545 for 2018).176 
Similarly, a simplified home office deduction allows taxpayers to deduct $5.00 
per square foot for the area-based portion of their home used exclusively for 
business, in lieu of deducting actual home office expenses and depreciation.177 
However, these measures cover just two of many different types of 
business expenses, and even the simplified rules appear to be difficult for 
taxpayers to apply. For example, in their study of Uber drivers, Professors 
Oei and Ring note that drivers who use the standard mileage deduction still 
face uncertainty and difficulty in tracking and calculating deductible car 
expenses.178 In terms of tracking mileage, Uber tracks and reports the miles 
driven with a passenger in the car, but does not report miles driven from 
one ride to the next, which should also constitute a deductible mileage 
expense.179 Additionally, Oei and Ring note that there is legal uncertainty 
associated with miles driven while waiting for a new job.180 The 
deductibility of those miles is unclear because expenses for commuting to 
and from work are generally considered to be nondeductible, while expenses 
for driving while at work generally are.181 
Taxpayers who are uncertain as to which expenses are deductible or how 
to calculate deductions will inevitably file inaccurate returns, which may 
deprive them of deductions that they are entitled to or shortchange the 
government of tax revenue. In the case of Uber drivers, for example, Oei and 
Ring report that many drivers calculate their standard mileage deduction based 
on all miles they drive with the Uber application turned on, even though some 
portion of those miles should likely be considered to be non-deductible 
commuter miles.182 
In addition to taxpayers mistakenly over-reporting deductions, a 
significant number are likely engaged in intentional over-claiming of 
deductions. The ability to cheat by underreporting receipts has greatly 
diminished with the proliferation of electronic payments and the decline in 
 
176 See supra note 65 (discussing the standard mileage deduction). 
177 See Rev. Proc. 2013-13; see also Simplified Home Office Deduction, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/simplified-option-for-home-office-
deduction [https://perma.cc/2W6W-H8ZH]. Among other requirements, the square footage may 
not exceed 300 square-feet and the home office must be used for business on a regular basis. Id. 
178 Oei & Ring, supra note 62, at 78-82, 80-81. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 See, e.g., Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 471 (1946) (articulating that 
the Tax Court below “disallowed . . . deductions on the ground that they represent living and personal 
expenses rather than traveling expenses incurred while away from home in the pursuit of business”); 
U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 463, CAT. NO. 11081L, TRAVEL, 
ENTERTAINMENT, GIFT, AND CAR EXPENSES 15 (2017) (“While you can’t deduct the costs of . . . trips 
[to and from home], you can deduct the costs of going from one client or customer to another.”). 
182 Oei & Ring, supra note 62, at 78-82. 
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the use of cash. This means that for dishonest taxpayers, deductions are the 
items that are easiest to strategically manipulate without the IRS noticing. 
And, as discussed above, a recent empirical study of 1099-K reporting appears 
to confirm that many small business owners are offsetting the compliance 
benefits of new information reporting rules by simply reporting more 
business deductions.183 
Finally, regardless of whether taxpayers are honest or knowledgeable about 
the tax law, tracking and reporting business deductions is time-consuming and 
burdensome. In the aggregate, the time and money that small business owners 
spend dealing with tax compliance obligations impose a significant social cost. 
Further, the complexity of tracking and reporting business deductions 
exacerbates problems of inaccuracy. Some taxpayers may keep shoddy records 
and/or guess the amount of their deductions, and evidence shows they are 
likely to err on the side of paying less tax rather than more.184 Other taxpayers 
likely forego deductions to which they are legitimately entitled because they 
are deterred by complexity. 
In an analogous context, studies of non-business deductions have shown that 
taxpayers forego itemized deductions in favor of claiming the standard deduction, 
even when they would pay less tax if they itemized.185 These taxpayers appear to 
give up valuable tax benefits (millions of tax dollars in the aggregate) because 
they perceive the compliance cost to exceed the benefit of itemizing.186 
Interestingly, one study also showed that the use of a tax return preparer did not 
mitigate the failure to itemize, suggesting that it is the recordkeeping burden, 
rather than tax return preparation, that largely deters taxpayers from itemizing 
their deductions.187 Although these studies do not directly address business 
 
183 Slemrod et al., supra note 97. The authors observed that taxpayers who received a Form 
1099-K in 2011 were “substantially more likely to report receipts almost exactly equal to expenses 
. . . in 2011 than in 2010.” Id. at 22. They also note that while bunching of income and expenses could 
occur for legitimate reasons (such as claiming legitimate expenses that had been foregone in previous 
years), the fact that taxpayers primarily increased “Other Expenses” on Schedule C, as opposed to 
increasing expenses in a number of different categories, suggests noncompliance is the most likely 
explanation. Id. at 25-26. 
184 See Phillips & Plumley, supra note 80, at 35. 
185 See Mark M. Pitt & Joel Slemrod, The Compliance Cost of Itemizing Deductions: Evidence from 
Individual Tax Returns, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1224, 1224 (1989) (“[T]here exist taxpayers who would 
save money by itemizing but who chose not to. We postulate that they so choose because the 
compliance cost of itemizing exceeds the tax savings that can be obtained.”); see also Youssef Benzarti, 
How Taxing is Tax Filing? Leaving Money on the Table Because of Compliance Costs 2 (Mar. 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript) (finding “that taxpayers could save money by itemizing and are aware of it 
but still claim the standard deduction”). 
186 See Pitt & Slemrod, supra note 185, at 1224 (estimating the foregone tax savings to be $196.2 
million); Benzarti, supra note 185, at 3 (estimating that an average of $617 per person is foregone 
from failing to itemize). 
187 Benzarti, supra note 185, at 4. 
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deductions, they demonstrate that taxpayers may forego the economic benefit of 
their tax deductions if the perceived compliance costs are too high.188 
2. Details of the Proposal 
To mitigate the overwhelming complexity associated with the current tax 
regime, legislators should enact a standard business deduction (SBD) for gig 
workers. The SBD would work like the current, below-the-line standard 
deduction: taxpayers could elect to deduct the SBD from their business 
income in lieu of deducting actual business expenses. However, if their actual 
expenses exceeded the SBD, they could instead deduct those expenses. 
Taxpayers would subtract either the SBD or their actual business expenses 
from their gross business receipts to arrive at a net business income amount, 
to which self-employment tax would then apply under the current rules. Net 
business income would then be reported on Form 1040 (as it is under the 
current system) and would be incorporated into adjusted gross income, 
subject to further reduction by below-the-line deductions (such as the section 
199A deduction). 
a. Structure and Scope of the SBD 
There are several possibilities for how to determine the amount of the 
SBD. One is to choose a flat dollar amount (adjusted annually for inflation), 
like the regular standard deduction. This would effectively exempt all 
business receipts from tax up to the amount of the flat SBD. Another 
alternative is to allow taxpayers to deduct a fixed percentage of their gross 
business receipts.189 Although there are upsides to both approaches (discussed 
further below), this Article recommends an SBD calculated as a percentage 
of the taxpayer’s gross business receipts. 
The proper percentage of gross receipts for the SBD depends on who can 
claim it. If made available to all independent contractors, a 60 percent SBD 
may be a sensible choice in light of the withholding proposal discussed above. 
A 60 percent SBD presumes a net profit ratio of 40 percent, which is in line 
 
188 However, there are some important differences between personal and business deductions 
in this context. Taxpayers who forego itemized deductions can still claim a standard deduction, 
whereas taxpayers who forego business deductions cannot deduct a flat amount in lieu of those 
deductions. But it is plausible that taxpayers may forego deducting some, though probably not all, 
business expenses if they don’t have good records or don’t want to go through the trouble of tracking 
and reporting them. 
189 Interestingly, the regular standard deduction started out as a percentage of adjusted gross 
income, rather than a flat amount. See John R. Brooks II, Doing Too Much: The Standard Deduction 
and the Conflict Between Progressivity and Simplification, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 203, 210 (2011) (“The 
optional standard deduction was set at 10% of AGI, up to a maximum of $500 for single taxpayers, 
$1000 for married filing jointly (or roughly $6250/$12,500 in 2011 dollars.” (footnote omitted)). 
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with average profit ratios for small Schedule C filers.190 If the SBD were 
limited only to gig workers,191 the OTA study indicates that a slightly higher 
SBD (closer to 70 percent) might be more appropriate.192 
An even more accurate approach would be to separate gig workers into two 
categories: those who engage in labor-only businesses and those who engage in 
businesses that involve both labor and capital.193 Examples of the former are 
businesses that require little to no materials or supplies and that are based almost 
solely on the worker’s services, such as childcare or housecleaning. Examples of 
the latter would be businesses like ride-sharing or apartment rentals, where 
taxpayers incur more significant expenses related to the use of their property or 
from the purchase of materials and supplies. The goal of this approach would be 
to carve out those taxpayers for whom an SBD would be a windfall. For example, 
OTA’s study indicates that sole proprietors without significant business expenses 
(under $5000), who likely engage in labor-only industries like childcare, have 
profit ratios averaging 90 percent, while those with more significant expenses 
(over $5000) have profit ratios closer to 40 percent. Policymakers could, therefore, 
create two SBDs. One could be a 10 percent SBD for workers in certain, specified 
industries known to be mostly service-oriented. All other businesses would be 
subject to a higher SBD of 60 percent.194 
The drawbacks of using two different percentages include having to define 
the labor-only businesses, along with potential gamesmanship if taxpayers 
who are properly classified as service providers seek an improper classification 
to benefit from the larger SBD. These costs would have to be weighed against 
the benefits of a more accurate regime, particularly given that a single SBD 
for all gig workers would result in revenue loss when claimed by taxpayers 
with minimal expenses. For the sake of simplicity, the remainder of this 
discussion analyzes a single-rate SBD of 60 percent of gross receipts, but the 
same principles discussed below would apply if two or more rates were used. 
The SBD could theoretically apply to any type of independent contractor, 
regardless of whether she works for a platform company. Non-gig workers 
 
190 See supra note 154 and accompanying text. The overall average for Schedule C filers is closer 
to 20 percent; the 40 percent eliminates payroll deductions, which I use as an admittedly rough 
proxy for bigger and more sophisticated businesses. Better, nonpublic data may exist that would 
allow for calculation of a more accurate average profit ratio for smaller Schedule C filers (e.g., those 
with receipts below $100,000). 
191 It may be difficult to define gig workers for this purpose. One imperfect but administrable 
approach could be to limit the SBD to workers who received income from specifically identified 
platform companies. 
192 See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
193 In that case, withholding could be based on these two categories as well, with two different 
schedules of withholding rates offered. 
194 In theory, there could be many different SBDs, based on each particular industry. However, 
the costs of this approach (complexity, line-drawing, gaming) likely outweigh the benefits. 
2018] Taxing the Gig Economy 1459 
earning relatively small amounts of business income still face the same 
disproportionately high tax compliance costs that gig workers do, and 
eliminating any distinction between gig and non-gig workers would prevent 
behavioral distortions resulting from taxpayers trying to classify themselves as 
a gig worker to partake in the regime. On the other hand, extending the SBD 
to all independent contractors magnifies potential revenue loss and efficiency 
costs (discussed further below). The most workable approach may be to start 
small, for example, by offering the SBD to gig workers only or only to workers 
in a few, narrowly defined industries. If such a regime proved successful, the 
SBD could gradually be expanded to include more types of small businesses.195 
b. Earnings Cap 
To limit any potential revenue loss associated with the SBD, and to target 
it at truly “small” business owners, Congress should put a cap on gross 
receipts eligible for the SBD. For example, the SBD might only apply to 
taxpayers earning gross business receipts up to $100,000.196 Business owners 
earning more than the cap would be subject to the current regime for 
deducting business expenses. The cap would be justifiable because, at a certain 
level of earnings, we can expect businesses to have better capacity to 
efficiently track and report business expenses. 
In addition to a cap on gross receipts earned from self-employment, it may 
also be desirable to impose a total income cap above which the SBD would not 
be available. For example, the SBD might only be available for taxpayers whose 
adjusted gross income is less than $150,000. This would prevent high-income 
employees who earn relatively small amounts of independent contractor 
income from using the SBD when they likely incurred little to no expenses. An 
example of such an individual might be a professor who receives a small 
honorarium for speaking. Taxpayers with adjusted gross income over a certain 
level are also less likely to be participating in the gig economy. 
 
195 Further, there is no theoretical reason that an SBD couldn’t also be applied to small 
businesses that are conducted through an entity like an LLC. However, if we think the use of an 
entity is a rough proxy for size and sophistication, there is perhaps less justification for a 
simplified regime in that case. On the other hand, limiting the SBD to sole proprietorships may 
distort choice-of-entity decisions, in which case it may be better to institute an earnings cap 
applicable to any non-corporate entity. 
196 An alternative to having the cap turn the SBD “off” would be to allow taxpayers to deduct 
the SBD from the first portion of their earnings up to cap, and then any excess earnings would be 
subject to the current rules for business deductions. But since the primary benefit of the SBD is to 
allow taxpayers to forego tracking expenses, it makes little sense to allow it for a threshold level of 
earnings if businesses will still have to track and report expenses above the threshold; at that point 
it serves as a subsidy rather than a simplification measure. 
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c. Flat Versus Percentage SBD: An Example 
To further explore the implications of a 60 percent SBD, and to contrast 
it with a flat SBD, it is useful to consider a simple example. Assume there are 
four taxpayers: Taxpayer 1 has $5000 of gross business receipts and $4500 of 
actual business expenses; Taxpayer 2 has $5000 of gross business receipts and 
$2500 of actual business expenses; Taxpayer 3 has $30,000 of gross business 
receipts and $27,000 of actual business expenses; and Taxpayer 4 has $30,000 
of gross business receipts and $15,000 of actual business expenses. For 
simplicity, assume the sole tax rate on all income is 20 percent. Table 2 depicts 
the consequences of both a $10,000 SBD and a 60 percent SBD.197 
 
Table 2 
 
 Taxpayer 1 Taxpayer 2 Taxpayer 3 Taxpayer 4 
Gross Receipts  $5000 $5000 $30,000 $30,000 
Actual Expenses $4500 $2500 $27,000 $15,000 
Profit ratio 10% 50% 10% 50% 
Actual Net Income $500 $2500 $3000 $15,000 
Actual Tax (20% rate) $100 $500 $600 $3000 
 
Net After  
$10,000 SBD 
__ __ $20,000 $20,000 
Tax After  
$10,000 SBD 
0 0 $4000 $4000 
Net After 60% SBD $2000 $2000 $12,000 $12,000 
Tax After 60% SBD $400 $400 $2400 $2400 
  
 
197 The example is oversimplified, because net business income will be subject to further 
reductions before arriving at taxable income (e.g., itemized deductions or the (regular) standard 
deduction). It is useful, therefore, to assume in this example that the taxpayer has income from other 
sources that exceeds the zero bracket created by the regular standard deduction and that net business 
income will be subject to tax. 
2018] Taxing the Gig Economy 1461 
d. Costs and Benefits of an SBD 
Although the example in Table 2 doesn’t cover every scenario, there are 
several general principles that can be observed. First, recall that a 60 percent 
SBD assumes that taxpayers have a profit ratio of 40 percent. This means that 
imposing a 60 percent SBD creates a revenue loss to the government for any 
taxpayer with a net profit ratio that is higher than 40 percent. The higher the 
actual net profit ratio, the greater the revenue loss will be. In the above 
example, Taxpayer 4 has a net profit ratio of 50 percent, and accordingly pays 
less tax ($2400 as opposed to $3000) with a 60 percent SBD. 
The reverse would be true for taxpayers with a net profit ratio below 40 
percent. For example, Taxpayer 3 has only a 10 percent profit ratio, and would 
pay significantly more tax under a 60 percent SBD ($2400 instead of $600). 
Thus, presumably Taxpayer 3 would forego the SBD and claim actual 
expenses, unless she determines that the compliance costs of claiming actual 
expenses exceed the tax benefit. 
Because some taxpayers with lower profit ratios will presumably claim 
actual expenses,198 it is uncertain if revenue gains and losses would cancel each 
other out. If there is a substantial number of taxpayers with profit ratios above 
the 40 percent ratio assumed by the 60 percent SBD (or if taxpayers who earn 
more than a 40 percent ratio have substantially higher receipts than those who 
do not), the revenue loss could be significant. But this is not necessarily fatal. 
The SBD will save significant compliance costs for affected taxpayers, and 
will also reduce administrative costs for the government, which must expend 
resources to monitor business deductions.199 Thus, potential revenue loss 
from the SBD must be weighed against these reduced compliance and 
administrative costs. However, the potential revenue loss also highlights the 
need for policymakers to carefully analyze the appropriate percentage amount 
for the SBD: further study may reveal that 60 percent is too high (or low) 
and that a different percentage (e.g., 50 percent) would be a more accurate 
proxy for business expenses. But while lowering the SBD would mitigate tax 
revenue loss, it would cause more taxpayers to claim actual expenses, which 
would diminish the reduction in compliance and administrative costs. 
 
198 But, as discussed above, other taxpayers will likely forego claiming actual expenses, even if 
it would result in less tax liability. See supra notes 185–187 and accompanying text. 
199 Cf. Louis Kaplow, The Standard Deduction and Floors in the Income Tax, 50 TAX L. REV. 1, 9 
(1994) (arguing that the regular standard deduction lowers compliance costs because it allows for 
“reduced recordkeeping, effort in learning the law, and time spent completing tax forms. 
Administrative cost savings include a reduction in effort to process returns, the need to audit returns, 
and the time required to conduct audits and engage in subsequent litigation.”). 
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e. Equity Implications of an SBD 
The SBD also involves trading off some degree of horizontal equity for 
reduced compliance and administrative costs.200 In the above example, 
Taxpayer 3 has actual net income of $3000 while Taxpayer 4 has actual net 
income of $15,000. Yet under either version of the SBD (60 percent or flat 
$10,000), they pay identical amounts of tax because they earned the same 
amount of gross receipts. Taxpayer 3 is overtaxed with the 60 percent SBD 
while Taxpayer 4 is undertaxed. If Taxpayer 3 opts out of the SBD, horizontal 
inequity is diminished but remains; in that case, Taxpayer 3 pays tax at a 20 
percent rate on actual net income while Taxpayer 4 pays $2400 of tax on 
$15,000 of actual net income, an effective rate of 16 percent. 
The same issue exists for Taxpayers 1 and 2. Again, the violation of 
horizontal equity is not necessarily fatal; rather, it is a cost that must be 
weighed against the simplification benefit of an SBD. This is precisely the 
same tradeoff that is made with the current standard deduction: some degree 
of accuracy and horizontal equity is sacrificed in exchange for the 
simplification benefits of foregoing itemization.201 
f. Additional Drawbacks of a Flat SBD 
The flat SBD raises some additional issues. Taxpayers with gross receipts 
at or below the flat amount would pay no tax on their business income, as is 
the case with Taxpayer 1 and Taxpayer 2 in the above example. This would 
cost the government more in lost tax revenue for those taxpayers below the 
threshold as compared to the percentage SBD, because taxpayers claiming the 
60 percent SBD would pay tax on their presumed 40 percent profit. For 
example, Taxpayers 1 and 2 pay $400 in tax with a 60 percent SBD and nothing 
with a $10,000 SBD. 
An upside of this approach is that it may be costless for these taxpayers 
to determine whether they should take the flat SBD or claim actual 
deductions. Whereas taxpayers claiming a 60 percent SBD would have to 
estimate whether their actual deductions exceeded 60 percent of their 
receipts, taxpayers claiming a flat $10,000 deduction would not have to make 
 
200 Cf. Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Analyzing the Standard Deduction as a Presumptive Tax, 
1 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 25, 27 (1994) (discussing the tradeoff between horizontal equity and 
compliance costs in the case of the regular standard deduction). 
201 Id. at 28; see also Kaplow, supra note 199, at 19-20 (“A higher threshold [for itemizing] 
sacrifices equity . . . but reduces compliance and administrative costs.”). In addition to 
simplification, the regular standard deduction is also intended to promote progressivity, as it creates 
a zero bracket amount. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 189, at 205 (“The progressivity purpose . . . is 
served by having a relatively large amount of otherwise taxable income go untaxed, through what is 
in essence a zero-percent tax bracket made of the standard deduction and personal exemptions.”). 
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such a calculation if their receipts were close to or under $10,000. However, 
while both a flat SBD and a percentage SBD pose horizontal equity issues, 
the perceived unfairness of a flat SBD may be greater, because it will be highly 
salient that taxpayers making under a fixed amount of gross receipts will be 
exempt from tax on their business receipts. This higher salience may lead to 
more behavioral distortions (e.g., overinvestment in the gig economy) than 
would be the case with a percentage SBD. 
Once the taxpayer’s gross receipts exceed a certain amount,202 the flat 
SBD would result in more revenue collected than the percentage SBD, as the 
benefit to the taxpayer decreases. For example, Taxpayer 3 and Taxpayer 4 
make $30,000 in gross receipts, so the $10,000 SBD results in significantly 
more tax liability ($4000) compared to the 60 percent SBD ($2400). But as 
gross receipts rise significantly above the flat SBD, fewer taxpayers will claim 
it, as business deductions are likely to exceed the SBD. (Neither Taxpayer 3 
nor Taxpayer 4 should claim the flat SBD in this example; although they 
might if they did not keep records.) This again means that the compliance 
and administrative benefits diminish. And whereas a percentage SBD could 
be advantageous for taxpayers at all levels of gross receipts (up to any cap 
imposed), a flat SBD would have a narrower reach. 
g. Coordination with Gross Receipts Withholding 
An additional advantage of a percentage SBD is that it is easier to coordinate 
with gross receipts withholding than a flat SBD. A major drawback of 
withholding on gross receipts is that those receipts may not be an accurate 
indicator of net income and, therefore, taxpayers may be grossly under-withheld 
or over-withheld. However, if policymakers can assume a fixed net profit 
ratio, then net business income is easy to estimate: it is simply the assumed 
profit ratio multiplied by gross receipts. Once net income can be estimated, 
withholding on business earnings is not unlike withholding on wages. Thus, 
using a 60 percent SBD would allow policymakers to assume that net business 
income is 40 percent of gross receipts and withhold on that basis. While these 
assumptions won’t hold up for taxpayers who don’t claim the SBD, that should 
only be a minority of business owners if the SBD is set sufficiently high. 
Further, because taxpayers who forego the 60 percent SBD typically will 
do so because they have expenses that exceed 60 percent of their gross 
receipts (i.e., a profit ratio lower than 40 percent), those taxpayers will end 
up over-withheld, rather than under-withheld. While this may create 
liquidity issues for taxpayers who are severely over-withheld, for many, it may 
 
202 For a $10,000 SBD, the benefit will be equivalent to a 60 percent SBD when gross receipts 
are $16,667; thereafter the $10,000 SBD is less advantageous to the taxpayer. 
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simply increase the size of their tax refund, which should have a positive 
impact on tax compliance. Those taxpayers who are concerned about over-
withholding could elect to reduce their withholding when they fill out the 
equivalent of a Form W-4 for the payer. 
The proper withholding amount is harder to approximate with a flat SBD. 
The more a taxpayer’s business expenses exceed the SBD, the less likely they 
are to claim it. And while withholding could continue to be based on an 
assumed profit ratio of 40 percent, far fewer businesses would claim exactly 
60 percent in expenses as compared to when the SBD was set at 60 percent 
of gross receipts. Thus, withholding is more likely to be inaccurate for more 
taxpayers with a flat SBD. 
In light of its advantages over a flat SBD, this Article recommends that 
Congress enact a percentage SBD for gig workers earning gross receipts 
under a certain threshold. The remainder of this Article will assume that 60 
percent is an appropriate percentage (based on IRS data on average profit 
ratios), but further study may suggest a different percentage. 
E. Combining the Proposals: Examples 
This section will expand on the example discussed above to illustrate the 
application of non-employee withholding in conjunction with a 60 percent 
SBD. For purposes of the example, consider six hypothetical taxpayers, A 
through F, with the gross business receipts and expenses depicted below in 
Table 3. Taxpayers A, B, and C each have $5000 of gross receipts, but have 
net profit ratios of 10 percent, 40 percent, and 80 percent, respectively. 
Taxpayers D, E, and F each have $30,000 of gross receipts, and also have net 
profit ratios of 10 percent, 40 percent, and 80 percent, respectively. Each of 
A-F performs services as an independent contractor for a single company. 
Assume further that each taxpayer is single with no dependents. Finally, 
assume Taxpayers A, B, and C each have $25,000 in wage income, no other 
income, and no itemized deductions, which means the marginal tax rate on 
their business income should be 12 percent.203 Accordingly, assume that they 
will be subject to withholding at a rate of 11 percent of their gross receipts.204 
Similarly, assume no other income or deductions for Taxpayers E, F, and G, 
except each has wages of $50,000, making their marginal tax rate 22 percent.205 
 
203 See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra note 37, § 11001 (establishing a 12 percent marginal tax rate 
for single filers making between $9,525 and $38,700). 
204 See supra tbl.1. 
205 See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra note 37, § 11001(a) (establishing a 22 percent marginal tax 
rate for single filers making between $38,700 and $82,500). 
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Assume that Taxpayers E, F and G are thus subject to withholding at a rate 
of 15 percent of their gross receipts.206 
Table 3 below depicts each taxpayer’s SBD, tax liability, withholding, and 
overpayment (i.e., potential refund amount) based on the assumed facts. It is 
assumed that Taxpayers A and D, each of whom has a net profit ratio of 10 
percent (i.e., actual expenses that exceed the 60 percent SBD), will claim 
actual expenses for purposes of this example, although that will not 
necessarily be the case. Taxpayers C and F, on the other hand, will claim the 
SBD because it exceeds their actual expenses. Taxpayers B and E have actual 
expenses equal to 60 percent of their gross receipts, so they will claim the 
SBD, but the result would be the same if they claimed actual expenses. 
 
Table 3 
 
Taxpayer A B C D E F 
Gross Receipts $5000 $5000 $5000 $30,000 $30,000 $30,000 
Actual Expenses $4500 $3000 $1000 $27,000 $18,000 $6000 
Actual Net 
Income $500 $2000 $4000 $3000 $12,000 $24,000 
Net Profit Ratio 10% 40% 80% 10% 40% 80% 
Total Tax207 
Without SBD 
$130 $500 $1010 $1030 $4140 $8270 
60% SBD $3000 $3000 $3000 $18,000 $18,000 $18,000 
Net Income 
After 60% SBD $2000 $2000 $2000 $12,000 $12,000 $12,000 
Total Tax 
With SBD 
$500 $500 $500 $4140 $4140 $4140 
Withheld 
Amount 
$550 
(11%) 
$550 
(11%) 
$550 
(11%) 
$4500 
(15%) 
$4500 
(15%) 
$4500 
(15%) 
Overpayment $420 $50 $50 $3470 $360 $360 
 
 
206 See supra tbl.1. 
207 The “Total Tax” is comprised of self-employment tax plus income tax, taking into account 
the deductibility of half of self-employment tax. It can be calculated by the following formula: 
N(0.93T + 0.14), where N is net business income and T is the marginal income tax rate—here, 12 
percent for Taxpayers A, B, and C and 22 percent for Taxpayers D, E, and F. Values are rounded to 
the nearest $10. 
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Because withholding rates are based on an assumed profit ratio of 40 
percent, the 60 percent SBD will provide a modest refund208 for taxpayers 
that claim it, as can be seen in the case of Taxpayers B, C, E, and F.209 Those 
with higher expenses who forego the SBD will have a larger refund ($420 for 
Taxpayer A instead of $50; $3,470 for Taxpayer D instead of $360). To the 
extent that taxpayers have significant other deductions, their ultimate tax 
liability will be reduced and their refunds will increase. 
To simplify the example, the section 199A deduction is not incorporated 
into the taxpayers’ tax liability in Table 3. Doing so would require extra steps 
in calculating the tax due, but does not significantly alter the example or 
change the overall application of the SBD.210 
III. ISSUES AND OBJECTIONS 
Each of the proposals in this Article has potential drawbacks, which are 
discussed in this Part. 
A. The Scope of the Proposals 
To begin with, critics of the proposals here might argue that the scope of 
the problem is too small to merit congressional action. They might assert, for 
example, that the size of the gig economy is small relative to the overall 
economy, and that the dollar amounts of tax involved do not merit 
policymakers’ attention. However, there are several reasons why the reforms 
discussed here would be worthwhile. First, the gig economy itself is 
expanding and the number of American taxpayers participating in it is 
projected to grow substantially in the next several years.211 As technology 
continues to evolve, new alternative work arrangements will also likely crop 
up that might not constitute “gig work” but implicate the same tax compliance 
and administrative issues. 
 
208 The modest refund—rather than a zero balance—results because the withholding rules 
proposed here assume a 15 percent self-employment tax rate and no deduction for self-employment 
tax, which will slightly overtax. See supra note 207. 
209 This assumes that these taxpayers do not have significant other income that is not subject 
to withholding, which could cause them to owe a balance. 
210 Because the section 199A deduction is taken below the line, after calculating net business 
income, it does not affect the calculation of the SBD and should not impact a taxpayer’s decision to 
claim (or not claim) the SBD. The total tax due would be adjusted by reducing net business income 
(after application of either the SBD or actual expenses) by the lesser of: (i) 20 percent of net business 
income or (ii) 20 percent of taxable income less net capital gain. The deduction applies for purposes 
of calculating income tax, but not self-employment tax. 
211 See supra note 12; see also Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 1054 (“[T]o the extent the new modes 
of production and consumption erode the traditional tax base, greater policy attention and new 
compliance solutions may be required.”). 
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Second, the reforms proposed here are also relevant for more traditional 
small business owners. On the one hand, extending the SBD to all sole 
proprietors might cause too much tax revenue loss past a certain threshold of 
earnings and, arguably, is no longer justifiable once businesses achieve the 
scope and scale to handle tax compliance obligations more efficiently. 
However, if the SBD can be successfully implemented for gig workers, it 
could eventually be expanded to cover other small businesses owners earning 
below a certain threshold of receipts. 
Additionally, even if the aggregate dollars at stake are low relative to other 
pressing tax reform issues, there is merit to improving tax compliance among 
truly small businesses. For example, some scholars have argued that while it 
may not raise significant amounts of revenue in the short-term, improving tax 
compliance among small businesses “bring[s] firms into the tax net, thus ensuring 
higher tax compliance if they expand over time.”212 Further, reciprocity theory 
suggests that improving compliance among one group of taxpayers may have 
positive spillover effects that boost compliance more broadly.213 
B. Objections Related to Withholding 
There are several constituencies that may object to non-employee 
withholding for gig workers and other independent contractors. First, the 
parties required to withhold may object because they do not want to incur the 
additional cost associated with tax withholding. However, for larger platform 
companies like Uber or TaskRabbit, the benefits of withholding for workers 
may exceed the financial costs of withholding. This is because simplifying 
workers’ tax compliance obligations may encourage work effort in general and 
make platform companies more attractive businesses to work for.214 Notably 
on this point, Etsy has recently advocated for optional tax withholding for its 
workers (and other gig workers), which number over 1 million.215 
Even for those payers that would not necessarily benefit financially, the 
costs of withholding are relatively modest in the technological age. Affected 
payers would already have payroll systems in place for issuing 1099s, so it is 
unlikely that imposing a withholding requirement would be overly 
burdensome. Further, economies of scale likely exist that make payer 
 
212 Anuradha Joshi, Wilson Prichard & Christopher Heady, Taxing the Informal Economy: The 
Current State of Knowledge and Agendas for Future Research, 50 J. DEV. STUD. 1325, 1329 (2014). 
213 See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and the Law, 102 MICH. 
L. REV. 71, 81 (2003) (“If most other individuals seem to be paying their taxes, then evasion will 
provoke either guilt, shame, or both in the reciprocator who covets the respect of others and of 
herself. If . . . most individuals appear to be evading, then complying won’t make her feel guilty or 
ashamed at all.”). 
214 See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text. 
215 ETSY, ECONOMIC SECURITY FOR THE GIG ECONOMY 4, 8-9 (2016). 
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withholding less costly on an aggregate basis as compared to the cost of 
individual workers remitting taxes during the year. 
Others may object to expanding withholding on theoretical grounds, 
arguing that it reduces the perceived burden of taxes and gives the 
government too much power to tax.216 Critics of withholding have also noted 
that a tax refund essentially amounts to an interest-free loan to the 
government.217 But those concerns are outweighed by the fact that 
withholding has a profoundly positive impact on tax compliance, making it 
one of the most powerful and important tax enforcement mechanisms at the 
government’s disposal. 
For example, in the case of wage withholding, the compliance rate is 
nearly perfect at 99 percent.218 And as discussed above in subsection II.C.1, 
withholding provides benefits that go beyond the deterrence advantages of 
third-party information reporting because it helps resolve liquidity and 
budgeting issues that may arise when taxpayers file their returns. 
Additionally, refunds resulting from tax withholding appear to have powerful 
framing effects that positively influence compliance. Further, 
notwithstanding arguments that withholding concedes too much taxing 
power to the government, it may be in line with taxpayer preferences. 
Although more empirical work should be done to understand taxpayers’ 
withholding preferences, it appears they prefer receiving a refund to owing a 
balance, in part to avoid uncertainty and complexity in ascertaining their tax 
liability.219 Further, because the withholding regime proposed here would 
allow for an opt-out, those taxpayers who prefer not to receive a refund could 
elect to pay estimated taxes instead. 
The most serious challenge to non-employee withholding is that finding 
an appropriate rate at which to withhold on gross receipts may turn out to be 
difficult as a practical matter. This concern about accuracy is important but is 
not insurmountable. It should be noted that no withholding regime—even 
wage withholding—is entirely accurate. The vast majority of employees 
receive significant tax refunds (with the average refund being approximately 
$3000220), yet it does not appear that wage withholding results in major 
liquidity issues for most taxpayers. Further, employees can alter their form 
W-4 to increase or decrease their withholding to bring it more in line with 
 
216 See, e.g., Aradhna Krishna & Joel Slemrod, Behavioral Public Finance: Tax Design as Price 
Presentation, 10 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 189, 194 (2003). 
217 See, e.g., Richard L. Doernberg, The Case Against Withholding, 61 TEX. L. REV. 595, 623 
(1982) (“Since the IRS normally computes overwithholding refunds without interest, the system 
causes taxpayers to forego the use of their funds during the year without compensation.”). 
218 See supra note 84. 
219 See supra notes 118–122 and accompanying text. 
220 Thomas, supra note 81, at 142 n.181. 
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their personal circumstances; independent contractors would be given an 
analogous option under the regime proposed here. 
The main challenge is finding the right balance between withholding 
enough tax to reap the compliance advantages, and not withholding so much 
tax as to wreak havoc on taxpayers’ finances. It’s possible that in the case of 
independent contractors like gig workers, further study of tax data may reveal 
a more appropriate presumed profit ratio based on average or modal values. 
Such a study is beyond the scope of this Article, but it suffices to say for this 
purpose that this information is ascertainable. Further, if non-employee 
withholding were combined with a 60 percent SBD, then accuracy would be 
significantly easier to achieve for those taxpayers who claimed the SBD. But 
even if an SBD were not politically feasible, non-employee withholding as a 
standalone policy continues to have merit. 
C. Objections Related to the SBD 
Calculating an appropriate percentage for the SBD comes with the same 
practical challenges that calculating a withholding rate does and, as 
mentioned above, further study may indicate that a higher or lower 
percentage is better targeted, or that having multiple SBDs is preferable. But 
even assuming that a 60 percent SBD will approximate business expenses for 
the largest number of affected taxpayers, an SBD still may impose efficiency 
and revenue costs that must be weighed against its benefits. 
As discussed above in subsection II.D.2, an elective SBD may reduce tax 
revenues because taxpayers with expenses that are below the 60 percent 
threshold would claim it while those that are above the threshold would not, 
meaning more deductions would be claimed overall. It’s not clear that this 
would be the case in practice, however, because some taxpayers above the 60 
percent threshold may still choose the SBD, analogous to taxpayers who 
currently forego itemization in lieu of the standard deduction. Those 
taxpayers may be acting rationally if the cost of tracking and reporting 
business expenses exceeds the benefit of foregoing the SBD. 
The principal argument behind the SBD, however, is that any potential 
revenue loss would be outweighed by the social gains resulting from reduced 
compliance burdens for taxpayers and reduced administrative costs for the 
IRS. An SBD implemented in conjunction with information reporting and 
withholding would be even more cost-effective, as these latter measures 
would undoubtedly reduce tax evasion and enhance revenue collection. 
Whether an SBD standing on its own would reduce tax evasion, however, is 
uncertain and merits further study. 
One source of uncertainty is whether a significant number of 
noncompliant taxpayers would forego the SBD in order to claim a higher 
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amount of expenses, attempting to “zero out” their income or come close to 
it. The SBD proposed here would be elective, so if taxpayers truly incurred 
business expenses that exceeded 60 percent of their gross receipts, they would 
be able to deduct those actual expenses and the overall measurement of their 
taxable income would be more accurate. But if a disproportionate number of 
taxpayers who forego the SBD are noncompliant taxpayers who are 
overclaiming expenses, then the potential revenue loss would be exacerbated 
by this evasion. However, there are several reasons that even noncompliant 
types might forego this strategy and still claim the SBD. 
First, if withholding is implemented, most taxpayers will be claiming a refund 
when they prepare their tax returns. Because taxpayers facing a gain tend to be 
more compliant overall, the framing advantage created by withholding may 
dissuade the overclaiming of expenses, as compared to the case where taxpayers 
overclaim expenses to avoid paying a balance when they file their return. 
Second, the presence of an SBD would allow the IRS to focus its 
enforcement resources on a smaller group of taxpayers who do not claim it, 
effectively making those who claim the SBD “audit-proof.” Even those 
taxpayers who would otherwise be prone to cheating may perceive that they 
will avoid IRS scrutiny more effectively by claiming the SBD and that, 
conversely, claiming expenses in excess of the SBD will invite IRS scrutiny. 
Accordingly, there is reason to think that implementation of the SBD may 
result in a relatively small number of taxpayers overclaiming expenses, thus 
positively influencing compliance overall. 
Even if the SBD reduces tax evasion, the efficiency of such a regime 
must be considered. The SBD might distort the decision between 
employment and self-employment, as well as decisions about the size of 
one’s business. Further, if the SBD is limited only to gig workers, it may 
distort investment in the gig economy. 
For gig workers (or other sole proprietors) that incur very few business 
expenses, the SBD is clearly favorable because it allows them to deduct 60 
percent of their receipts even if their actual deductions would be much lower. 
Employed taxpayers performing similar services, on the other hand, generally 
cannot deduct business expenses. The SBD would create a strong incentive, then, 
for taxpayers in low-cost industries who have the option to be self-employed to 
opt out of employment or to characterize employment-like relationships as 
self-employment. Such a distortion could cause overinvestment in some sectors 
and underinvestment in others, would result in additional revenue loss, and 
could encourage noncompliance if taxpayers seek to incorrectly categorize 
themselves as gig workers or as otherwise self-employed. 
Notwithstanding these incentives, the magnitude of such distortions is 
uncertain. First, there are already some tax advantages to self-employment, 
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like the ability to deduct minor business expenses that are not deductible by 
employees and, for dishonest taxpayers, greater ease in underreporting 
taxable income. While the SBD would make self-employment more attractive 
in some industries (those with high profit ratios), it is unclear how much this 
would add to existing incentives. Further, there are many non-tax reasons that 
taxpayers may prefer employment, such as job security, sick leave, paid 
vacations, and health insurance and other benefits. Presumably many 
individuals would prefer to retain their employment status because they 
believe these benefits outweigh whatever tax benefit would be realized from 
the SBD. Further, many taxpayers likely take whatever work is available to 
them, and might not have the option to move back and forth between 
employment and self-employment in the same industry. 
In addition to potential distortions between employment and self-
employment, applying the SBD to only “small” businesses below a threshold 
of receipts requires line drawing, which will also create distortions, either in 
the investments made or the amount of receipts reported.221 To see why this 
is so, imagine a 60 percent SBD that applies only to businesses that earn at 
or below $100,000 in gross receipts. Assume that a taxpayer incurs $10,000 of 
fixed costs to produce receipts somewhere in the neighborhood of $100,000. 
If he has precisely $100,000 in receipts, his tax under the SBD is based on 
$40,000 of net income. If he earns $100,001, his taxed is based on his true net 
income of $90,001, resulting in an extremely high marginal tax rate on the 
additional dollar of income.222 
But although the SBD threshold would likely impact reporting behavior for 
some taxpayers,223 it seems less likely that the threshold would have a significant 
impact on investment decisions. Taxpayers choosing among investments at or 
around the threshold level of receipts probably cannot accurately predict exactly 
where their receipts would come out and, thus, it seems unlikely they would 
choose one business over the other because of the SBD. 
For those considering an investment well above the threshold for the 
SBD, the analysis is different. When considering two alterative businesses 
with high profit ratios, where one would qualify the taxpayer for the SBD 
and one would not, the business that qualified for the SBD would result in a 
 
221 The potential problem of taxpayers segregating lines of business into multiple “small” businesses 
could be addressed by applying the threshold and SBD in the aggregate to each individual taxpayer. 
222 One response to this cliff effect is to make the 60 percent SBD apply in all cases to the first 
$100,000 of gross receipts, with the taxpayer’s actual profit ratio applying thereafter. However, this 
would generate revenue loss without an offsetting reduction in compliance and enforcement costs, 
because taxpayers over the threshold would still have to track business expenses and the IRS would 
still have to monitor them. 
223 For example, a taxpayer who earns $100,001 of receipts may simply report that he earned 
$100,000 so he can claim the SBD. However, this wouldn’t be possible if all receipts were subject to 
1099 reporting. 
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lower effective tax rate and a higher after-tax rate of return as compared to 
the one that did not qualify.224 But choosing a business that would generate 
low receipts over one that would generate high receipts would only be rational 
if the taxpayer could invest his remaining funds at a return that would exceed 
the after-tax return on the bigger business. In the real world, it is unclear how 
many small, individual business owners make decisions this way. It seems 
plausible that many individuals choose the line of business they think will be 
most profitable (and perhaps enjoyable), preferring a larger absolute return 
even if it comes at a higher effective tax rate. Given the relative lack of 
sophistication of many gig workers, it is also questionable whether the lower 
effective tax rate imposed by the SBD would even enter into their calculus. 
In any event, these potential efficiency costs must be weighed against the 
advantages of an SBD. The costs of behavioral distortions induced by a gross 
receipts cap would ideally be outweighed by the reduction in compliance and 
administrative costs resulting from the SBD. In an analogous context, this 
assumption underlies the small-firm exemption available in most countries 
with a value added tax: firms have similar incentives to reduce reported or 
actual receipts to fall below the VAT exemption threshold, yet policymakers 
deem the costs outweighed by the administrative and compliance advantages 
of the exemption.225 
In sum, the efficiency and revenue costs of an elective SBD are uncertain, 
and policymakers would be wise to undertake further study of taxpayer 
responses to an SBD before implementing such a policy on a broad level. 
However, there is reason to think that behavioral distortions would be 
modest, that evasion would decline, and that potential revenue loss would be 
offset by a vast reduction in compliance and administrative costs. 
CONCLUSION 
The current small business tax regime—one in which individuals are 
expected to adhere to burdensome recordkeeping and filing requirements and 
pay taxes on an honor system—is rife with costs. Perhaps most indicative of the 
 
224 Consider an SBD with a $100,000 threshold as an example. A taxpayer who earns $200,000 
in gross receipts with a 90 percent profit ratio would have a higher effective tax rate than a taxpayer 
with the same profit ratio who earns $100,000, because the SBD would enable the latter to claim 60 
percent in expenses while the first taxpayer could claim only 10 percent. Thus, the first taxpayer 
would pay tax on $180,000 of net income, while the second would pay tax on $40,000 in reported 
income, when actual net income is $90,000. 
225 See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE 
DEBATE OVER TAXES 248 (4th ed. 2008) (“The conventional wisdom among VAT experts is that 
the administrative and compliance costs savings from exempting firms with revenues below some 
moderate threshold outweighs the efficiency cost of this approach. For this reason, most countries 
that operate a VAT do exempt firms with turnover below a certain threshold.”). 
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regime’s shortcomings is the fact that the government collects less than half of 
the tax owed by individual small business owners.226 But the digitization of 
commerce has given Congress the tools to vastly simplify tax compliance and 
enforcement for gig workers and other types of small business owners. 
While neither proposal discussed here is a panacea, implementing gross 
receipts withholding along with a standard business deduction for gig workers 
should reduce noncompliance and make the tax system significantly more 
efficient. And while each of these proposals has merit as a standalone policy, 
gross receipts withholding based on a presumed 40 percent profit ratio would 
be harmonious with a standard deduction equal to 60 percent of gross receipts. 
Although further study may reveal a more accurate presumed net profit 
percentage, the underlying structure of the proposals would remain the same. 
What’s more, these proposals represent reforms that should transcend party 
lines and provide clear benefits to both the government and taxpayers alike. 
 
 
226 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
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